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ABSTRACT
We incorporate gender bias against girls in the family, the school and the labor market in a
model of intergenerational persistence in schooling where parents self-finance children’s education
because of credit market imperfections. Parents may underestimate a girl’s ability, expect lower
returns, and assign lower weights to their welfare (“pure son preference”). The model delivers the
widely-used linear conditional expectation function (CEF) under constant returns and separabil-
ity, but generates an irrelevance theorem: parental bias does not affect relative mobility. With
diminishing returns and complementarity, the CEF can be concave or convex, and gender bias
affects both relative and absolute mobility. We test these predictions in India and China using
data not subject to coresidency bias. The evidence rejects the linear CEF, both in rural and urban
India, in favor of a concave relation. The girls face lower mobility irrespective of location in India
when born to fathers with low schooling, but the gender gap closes when the fathers are college
educated. In China, the CEF is convex for sons in urban areas, but linear in all other cases.
The convexity for urban sons supports the complementarity hypothesis of Becker et al. (2018),
and leads to gender divergence in relative mobility for the children of highly educated fathers. In
urban China, and urban and rural India, the mechanisms are underestimation of ability of girls
and unfavorable school environment. There is some evidence of pure son preference in rural India.
The girls in rural China do not face bias in financial investment by parents, but they still face
lower mobility when born to uneducated parents. Gender barriers in rural schools seem to be the
primary mechanism, with no convincing evidence of parental bias.
Key Words: Gender Bias, Intergenerational Mobility, Education, Becker-Tomes Model,
Complementarity, Son Preference, India, China, Coresidency Bias
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(1) Introduction
Gender bias against girls in developing countries has been the focus of a large and
growing economic and sociological literature. Son preference, selective abortion, genital
mutilation, mobility and social restrictions such as Purdah are widely noted. There is a
broad consensus that education is a key policy instrument for tackling gender disparity and
socioeconomic inequality (see, for example, Stiglitz (2012), Duflo (2012), Rajan (2010),
Jayachandran (2015)). This paper provides an analysis of gender gap in education in
China and India from the perspective of intergenerational mobility.2 Most of the studies of
intergenerational mobility, both in developed and developing countries, focus on the father-
son linkage, and research on women in general and on gender bias in particular remains
scant.3
Many existing studies on intergenerational mobility, especially in developing countries,
lack a well-articulated theoretical foundation. As emphasized recently by Mogstad (2017),
it is thus difficult to interpret the estimates, or understand the underlying economic mech-
anisms. We develop a model of intergenerational educational persistence in the tradition
of Becker and Tomes (1986) that captures different sources of gender bias against girls in
the family, the school, and the labor market. The sources of gender bias in the family are:
(i) biased estimate of academic ability, (ii) lower weight to the welfare of a daughter com-
pared to that of a son (we call it “pure son preference”), and (iii) lower expected returns
from a daughter’s education. The expected returns may in part reflect biases in the labor
market. These factors affect the financial investment in education of the daughters, but the
daughters may also face bias in non-financial aspects such as home tutoring.4 Moreover,
unfavorable school environment, for example, the absence of bathroom for girls, can result
2In most developing countries, girls have historically lagged behind the boys in educational attainment.
However, there is evidence that the gender gap in schooling attainment may be narrowing down over time.
Reverse gender gap has emerged in Latin America in educational attainment (Grant and Behrman (2010)).
3Among the few available contributions on intergenerational mobility of daughters, see Chadwick and
Solon (2002) on USA, Azam (2016) on India, and Torche (2015b) on Mexico. But they do not study the
effects of gender bias. For a discussion on gender and intergenerational mobility with a focus on persistence
in gender attitude and labor market participation, see Luke (2019). For evidence on intergenerational
transmission of gender attitudes in India, see Dhar et al. (2019).
4A better educated parent may act as a more effective home tutor, but son preference may mean priority
(and more attention) given to the sons.
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in dropouts when a girl reaches puberty.
The conditional expectation function (CEF) of children’s education given parental edu-
cation is assumed to be linear in all of the existing studies on intergenerational educational
mobility we are aware of.5 In a Becker-Tomes model with self-financing constraint, a linear
and additively separable education production function delivers a linear estimating equa-
tion for intergenerational educational persistence.6 This “linear model” of intergenerational
educational mobility, however, yields strong predictions: parental bias against girls in fi-
nancial investment does not affect relative mobility; the effects of parental gender bias are
captured solely by the intercept of the regression function. Although the linear estimating
equation has been the workhorse in the current literature, the sharp implications of the
linear model for gender bias in intergenerational educational mobility have not been noted
before, to the best of our knowledge.
When the education production function exhibits diminishing returns, the estimating
equation for intergenerational educational mobility is concave in parental schooling, as-
suming that the separability holds.7 However, separability may not be an appropriate
assumption, especially in the urban areas with developed education market. As noted by
Becker et al. (2015), the better educated parents may reap higher marginal returns from
financial investment because they are more-efficient in such investment decision making
in a complex education market, thus parental education is likely to be complementary to
financial investment in such a context. This complementarity, when strong enough, can
5Functional form assumptions are usually not tested in much of the literature on intergenerational
mobility, both in the developed and developing countries. For an important recent exception see the
discussion in Chetty et al. (2014) on the instability of the log-linear model of intergenerational income
mobility in USA.
6This, in particular, implies that (i) there are constant returns to financial investment in education, and
(ii) the financial investment and the direct effects of parental education are separable.
7To our knowledge, the quadratic intergenerational educational persistence equation was first derived
by Becker et al. (2015). Their set-up is different from ours in terms of modeling the credit constraint. They
assume that the low income parents pay a higher interest rate, but can borrow as much as they want given
the interest rate. We assume that the parents cannot borrow from the credit market to finance educational
investment and thus use part of their income for such investment. The credit market model we adopt is
similar to Becker (1991). Given that the education loan markets are practically non-existent for most of
the parents in India and China, we believe this is an appropriate modeling choice. Becker et al. (2015) do
not explore gender differences in intergenerational mobility. Also, it is not possible to derive a linear CEF
for intergenerational educational persistence in their model set-up.
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more than offset the diminishing returns in the education production function making the
intergenerational educational persistence equation convex. In contrast to the linear model,
parental gender bias affects both relative and absolute mobility when diminishing returns
and/or complementarity are important.
A credible empirical analysis of the above ideas, however, depends critically on the qual-
ity of the data available.8 Most of the existing household surveys use coresidency criteria
to define household membership and thus miss children from the sample in a non-random
fashion. This results in truncation bias in the estimates of widely used measures of inter-
generational mobility such as intergenerational regression coefficient (IGRC). As reported
by Emran et al. (2018), the truncation bias due to coresidency can vary significantly across
gender and countries, making it doubly hazardous to rely on the coresident sample for a
comparative study of gender bias in China and India. We take advantage of rich household
surveys from China and India that do not suffer from coresidency bias for our analysis.
Since the theory yields interesting predictions regarding the effects of gender bias on the
educational investment, our empirical analysis estimates both the intergenerational persis-
tence equation (using IHDS 2012 for India, and CFPS 2016 for China) and the investment
equation (using IHDS 2005 and NSS1995 for India, and CFPS 2010 for China).
The main conclusions from the empirical analysis are as follows. In India, the inter-
generational mobility equation is concave irrespective of gender and geographic location,
rejecting the almost universally used linear specification in the existing literature. The con-
cavity suggests that the complementarity between financial investment and parental edu-
cation emphasized recently by Becker et al. (2018) may not be important in India. There
are strong diminishing returns to both financial investment and parental direct inputs in
education for girls in rural India. The girls face significantly lower relative and absolute
mobility when the father is uneducated, but the gender difference becomes negligible when
the father is college educated.9 The relative magnitudes of the estimated parameters of the
8A large literature on intergenerational income mobility in the context of developed countries emphasizes
the attenuation bias in the intergenerational income elasticity estimates due to measurement error in yearly
income data. See, for example, the seminal analysis by Solon (1992). Measurement error is likely to be
less of a concern in education data (Deaton (1987)).
9If one relies on the linear CEF estimates, s/he would miss the gender convergence at the right tail of
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investment and mobility equations across gender are combined with substantial evidence of
higher returns to education for girls in urban and rural India to sort out the mechanisms.
The evidence suggests that parents systematically underestimate the academic ability of
daughters, and the girls also face disadvantages in the school. There is evidence of pure
son preference in rural India.
In urban China, the CEF is convex for sons, while we cannot reject linearity for the
daughters. The evidence of convexity for sons is interesting, providing the first evidence
in favor of the complementarity hypothesis of Becker et al. (2015, 2018) in the context
of a developing country. Similar to urban India, the daughters of uneducated fathers face
significantly lower mobility, in terms of both absolute and relative measures. There is
evidence of gender convergence in absolute mobility for the most educated households,
but, unlike urban India, there is widening gender gap in relative mobility at the right tail
of father’s schooling distribution. The main mechanisms at work are, however, similar to
those in urban India noted above.
The results on rural China are different: the evidence is largely consistent with a linear
model with no significant diminishing returns or complementarity. The IGRC estimate
is larger for girls, while the intercept is lower. The girls face lower expected years of
schooling when the fathers have less than 14 years of schooling, but the advantage flips in
the households with higher schooling of fathers. The estimates of educational investment
shows that the girls consistently enjoy an advantage. The constraints girls face in the school
is a major factor behind the observed pattern of the estimates, but the evidence cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no parental bias.
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a theoretical model
in the tradition of Becker and Tomes (1986) that incorporates gender bias in both financial
investment and nonfinancial inputs by parents, and also gender bias in the labor market
(returns to education) and in the school. The next section provides a discussion on the data
sets used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 reports and discusses the estimates of the
investment and mobility equations for the urban households, along with an analysis of how
father’s schooling distribution.
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the estimated parameters can help sort out the mechanisms driving the observed pattern
of educational investment and intergenerational mobility. Section (5) then discusses the
corresponding results for the rural households. Section (6) concludes with a summary of
the main findings and the methodological contributions of the paper.
(2) Related Literature
The literature on intergenerational mobility in developed countries is well-developed,
with many fundamental theoretical and empirical contributions. For excellent surveys of
the literature, please see Solon (1999), Black and Devereux (2011), and Bjorklund and
Salvanes (2011). The focus of this literature has been on intergenerational (permanent)
income persistence, and a lot of effort has been devoted to understanding the biases that
arise from measurement error and life-cycle effects. Also, most of the studies deal with the
father-son linkages, and, as noted above, research on women, and in particular on gender
bias is lacking.
In contrast, research on intergenerational economic mobility in developing countries
remains relatively neglected. This partly reflects the data constraints. Good quality income
data for long enough time periods to calculate permanent income remains rare. As a result,
the focus of the research on developing countries has been on intergenerational educational
persistence. For a discussion on the methodological challenges and data constraints in
research on intergenerational mobility in developing countries, see Emran and Shilpi (2019).
Recent surveys of this literature include Iversen et al. (2019), Behrman (2019), Torche
(2019). For cross-country evidence, please see Hertz et al. (2008), Narayan et al. (2018)
and Bhalotra and Rawlings (2013). The recent studies on India include Azam and Bhatt
(2015), Azam (2016), Emran and Shilpi (2015), Asher et al. (2018), Maitra and Sharma
(2010), and Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017). On intergenerational mobility in China, see,
among others, Fan et al. (2019), Golley and Kong (2013), Emran and Sun (2015), Gong
et al. (2012), Park and Zou (2017), and Knight et al. (2011). Most of the studies on India
and China focus on intergenerational schooling persistence based on a linear CEF, but none
of them derive the estimating equation from theory.
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(3) Sons vs. Daughters: A Model of Gender Bias in Intergenerational Edu-
cational Mobility
The economy consists of households with a parent and a child (son denoted by s) or
daughter (denoted by d). The parent of child i has schooling Hpi . Given the education
level, the parent’s income is determined as follows (similar to the specification adopted by
Solon (2004), and Becker et al. (2015)):
Y
p
i = Y
p
0
+RpHpi (1)
Since our empirical work focuses on father’s education because of data constraints,
in what follows, we couch the discussion in terms of father as the parent. The income
determination equation assumes that the fathers with zero year of schooling earns Y p
0
> 0,
and the returns to education is Rp in the parental generation.10 The assumption that
Y
p
0
> 0 reflects our empirical context where 15-40 percent of fathers have zero year of
schooling, but all the households report positive income.
The father allocates his income Y pi to own consumption C
p
i and investment in child’s
education Ii, thus the budget constraint is
Y
p
i ≧ C
p
i + Ii (2)
The budget constraint assumes that there is no credit market where the father can
borrow to finance children’s education, thus has to pay from his own income. As noted
earlier, this is a plausible assumption in the context of developing countries where the
student loan market (public or private) is underdeveloped or nonexistent.
Following Becker et al. (2015), we assume that the education production function
exhibits three features: (i) diminishing returns to financial investment, (ii) complementarity
between the financial investment, and parental education (iii) the direct effect of parent’s
10We ignore the gender differences in the parental income, as our empirical analysis focuses on the effects
of father’s education due to substantial missing observations on mother’s education.
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education capturing non-financial aspects such as “cultural capital”:
Hc = δ0 + δ
j
1
I − δ
j
2
I2 + δj
3
Hp − δ
j
4
(Hp)2 + δj
5
IHp (3)
where j = s, d is the gender index (s for son, and d for daughter). We assume that
δ0, δ
j
1
, δ
j
3
> 0 and δj
2
, δ
j
4
, δ
j
5
≥ 0. The last inequalities are weak to allow for the possibility
that over the relevant range the education production function is approximately linear.
The direct effect of parental education can be concave or linear. The direct effect captures
nonfinancial aspects of parental influences including home tutoring and role model effects as
noted before.11 When the complementarity effect is ignorable, we have δj
5
= 0. The intercept
term (δ0) captures the common family and school factors that affect a child’s education
irrespective of gender and thus is not indexed by j. The slope parameters determining the
effects of financial investment are specified as below:
δ
j
1
= δ0
1
+ γ1q
j + γ2φ
δ
j
2
= δ0
2
− ω1q
j − ω2φ
(4)
where q denotes the institutional quality such as schools, and φ is the ability of a child.
The specifications in (4) imply that higher ability and better school quality increases the
marginal returns to educational investment by both increasing the linear coefficient δji and
by reducing the degree of diminishing returns through a lower δj
2
. Note that the ability
parameter in the production function is not gender-specific, but the institutional quality
depends on the gender because of factors such as role model effects of female teachers,
school policy on gender bias and its enforcement, and the availability of appropriate in-
frastructure such as separate restrooms for women which becomes an important factor for
girls, especially after puberty (see the discussion by Adukia (2017) in the context of India).
When there are few or no female teachers and no restroom in the school, we would expect
qd < qs. The assumption that ability is not indexed by gender reflects substantial evidence
that cognitive ability does not depend on the gender of a child in a systematic manner,
11These are part of the family endowment transmission across generations in Becker and Tomes (1979),
Becker and Tomes (1986), and Becker (1991).
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ceteris paribus.
But it is important to appreciate the distinction between the true ability of a child
φ and a parent’s estimate of a child’s ability denoted as φ˜j. The investment choices of
parents are determined by the estimated ability φ˜j, and given an investment level, the
actual educational attainment is determined by the true ability of a child φ. In societies
where son preference is strong, it is likely that the parents would overestimate a son’s
ability and underestimate a daughter’s ability, implying that φ˜s > φ > φ˜d.12 The expected
schooling (denotes as H˜c) for a given level of financial investment can be written as:
H˜cj = δ0 + δ˜
j
1
I − δ˜
j
2
I2 + δj
3
Hp − δ
j
4
(Hp)2 + δj
5
IHp (5)
where δ˜j
1
=
(
δ0
1
+ γ1q
j + γ2φ˜
j
)
and δ˜j
2
=
(
δ0
2
− ω1q
j − ω2φ˜
j
)
In contrast to the true
production function (3), ability is gender specific in equation (5), with j = s, d.
The income function for the children is:
Y
cj
i = Y
cj
0
+RcjHci (6)
The returns to education is gender specific; when returns to education is lower for
girls, we expect Rcs > Rcd. There is substantial evidence that returns to education in
the labor market may be higher for women. For example, in their extensive cross-country
study, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018) find that, in about 66 percent cases, returns
to education in the labor market are higher for women. Higher returns for girls are also
observed in India and China during 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, the estimates
reported by Bargain et al. (2009)).13 However, the evidence also consistently shows that
12If gender bias in the household is strong enough to systematically discriminate against girls in food
and medical care, especially in the early years of a child’s life, the girls may end up with lower academic
ability. There is evidence that the development of brain of a child is significantly affected by socioeconomic
conditions (Noble et al. (2015). In this case, the inequality above will reflect both the actual differences
in cognitive ability generated by gender bias, and also biased estimate given a certain level of cognitive
ability.
13The estimated coefficient for the higher secondary schooling in 2002-2004 from the Mincer equation
are: 1.09 (women, India), 0.55 (men, India), 0.51 (women, China), and 0.26 (men, China) (see Table A3
in Bargain et al. (2009)). They use CHIP data from China and NSS data for India. Their estimates are
at the national level, they do not present separate estimates for rural and urban areas. We discuss the
8
there is gender wage-gap against the women due to the fact that Y cd
0
< Y cs
0
in most of the
cases. It is well-known in the literature that returns to education plays a prominent role in
intergenerational educational persistence (Becker (1991), Solon (1999), Solon (2004)). As
we will see below, in contrast, the intercept Y cj
0
matters much less.14
For the main analysis of the mechanisms underlying intergenerational persistence in
schooling, we assume that the parents are aware of the fact that the labor market returns
are higher for the girls. We are not aware of any studies on eliciting parental belief about
returns to education for sons vs. daughters in our study countries.15 In fact, data on what
parents state (which may differ from the true belief) when asked about relative returns to
education in a survey are also not available in the major data sets we are aware of in India
(such as NSS, IHDS, REDS, NHSF) and China (CHIP, CFPS, CHNS). The only data set
we are aware of is Gansu Survey of Children and Families in China. An analysis of the
Gansu survey shows that about 55 percent of mothers disagree that returns to education
(in terms of higher income) is higher for sons. We also explore the implications of the
alternative assumption where parents believe that the returns to education is lower for
girls notwithstanding the evidence noted above. This alternative assumption, however,
leads to implausible conclusions, as we discuss below in the context of urban India in
section (4.1) below. The consumption sub-utility function of the parent is given by:
U (Cp) = α1C
p − α2 (C
p)2 (7)
(3.1) Optimal Educational Investment
The parent’s optimization problem is (denoting the Lagrange multiplier on the budget
available evidence on rural and urban areas below which is consistent with the national-level results of
Bargain et al. (2009).
14This refers to educational mobility; wage gap clearly has important implications for income and poverty.
15In a widely-cited study, Jensen (2010) shows that parents in Dominican Republic underestimate the
returns to education, but he does not analyze possible gender differences in parental belief. In a related
study in the context of India, Jensen (2012) finds that women’s education responds positively to labor
market opportunities, providing a basis for the argument that labor market returns are important for
parental decisions regarding women’s education in India.
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constraint by λ):
MaxCp,IV
p = U (Cp) + σjE
(
Y
cj
i
)
+ λ [Y pi − C
p
i − Ii] (8)
where σj is the degree of parental altruism, and son preference implies that σs > σd, and
parents use production function (5) to estimate the expected income of children E
(
Y
cj
i
)
.
The first order conditions are:
α1 − 2α2C
p − λ = 0
σjRcj
(
δ˜
j
1
− 2δ˜j
2
I + δj
5
Hp
)
− λ = 0
(9)
Using the first order conditions and equations (1) and (2) above, we solve for the optimal
investment in a child’s education as a function of parental education:
I∗j = θj
0
+ θj
1
HP (10)
where
θ
j
0
=
2α2Y
p
0
+ δ˜j
1
σjRcj − α1
2
{
α2 + δ˜
j
2
σjRcj
} (11)
θ
j
1
=
2α2R
p + δj
5
σjRcj
2
{
α2 + δ˜
j
2
σjRcj
} (12)
It is important to note some of the implications of equations (11) and (12) which are
not well-appreciated in the current literature where linearity is a maintained assumption.
As we discuss below, the intergenerational mobility equation is necessarily linear when the
education production function is linear (δj
2
= δj
4
= δj
5
= 0). In this case, gender bias in
the form of pure son preference (i.e., σd < σs), lower returns to education for girls (i.e.,
Rcd < Rcs), low estimate of academic ability of girls (i.e., φ˜d < φ˜s), and bias against girls
in schools (i.e., qd < qs) implies that θd
0
< θs
0
, but θd
1
= θs
1
. The result that such gender
bias does not affect the slope parameter is especially striking, and suggests that we should
be careful in interpreting the evidence from the investment equation (10) above. Without
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the benefit of the theory, most of the researchers would interpret the finding that the data
do not reject θd
1
= θs
1
as evidence against gender bias in educational expenditure. This is
compounded by the fact that the focus of the analysis usually is on the slope parameter,
and many studies do not report the intercept estimates which should be the focus of an
analysis of gender bias if the linear model is correct.
(3.2) Intergenerational Persistence in Education
The optimal education of a child can be written as follows:
Hcj
∗
= δ0 + δ
j
1
I∗j − δ
j
2
(
I∗j
)2
+ δj
3
Hp − δ
j
4
(Hp)2 + δj
5
I∗jHp (13)
where I∗ is given by equation (10) above.
Since optimal investment I∗ is a linear function of parental education Hp, Hcj
∗
is a
quadratic function of parental education Hp even when δj
4
= 0 and δj
5
= 0. The estimating
equation for intergenerational persistence implied by equation (10) and (13) above is as
follows:
Hcj
∗
= ψj
0
+ ψj
1
Hp + ψj
2
(Hp)2 (14)
where
ψ
j
0
= δ0 + θ
j
0
[
δ
j
1
− δ
j
2
θ
j
0
]
ψ
j
1
= θj
1
(
δ
j
1
− 2δj
2
θ
j
0
)
+ δj
3
+ δj
5
θ
j
0
; ψj
2
= θj
1
(
δ
j
5
− δ
j
2
θ
j
1
)
− δ
j
4
(3.3) Sorting Out the Mechanisms
A comparison of the two estimating equations (investment equation (10) and mobility
equation (14)) above shows that the parental gender bias in ability estimate and pure son
preference are reflected in the parameters of the investment equation, while the estimated
mobility parameters are useful in understanding the role played by biases in the direct
impact of parents on children’s education. As we will see below in the empirical analysis
section, both in India and China, the evidence, in general, suggests an important role for the
bias arising from direct (nonfinancial) impact of parents through, for example, homework
help and role model effects.
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The estimated parameters from the investment equation (10) and the mobility equation
(14) provide us 5 binary relations, which impose restrictions on the potential explanations,
and help sort out the existence and mechanisms of gender bias when combined with informa-
tion on gender differences in returns to education.16 In particular, combining information
about returns to education with the estimated intercepts of the investment equation can
help infer whether the parents underestimate a girl’s ability and whether the girls face
constraints in the school. This can be seen by considering the intercept as a function of
returns to education, i.e., the function θj
0
(Rcj). It is easy to check that θd
0
= θs
0
< 0 when
Rcd = Rcs = 0, implying that the intercept of the function θj
0
(Rcj) is negative and does
not depend on the gender of a child. As we discuss in the online appendix, θj
0
(Rcj) is
an increasing function of returns to schooling, i.e.,
∂θ
j
0
∂Rcj
> 0 with a horizontal asymptote
equal to
δ˜
j
1
2δ˜j
2
. More importantly, if θj
0
> 0, the slope
∂θ
j
0
∂Rcj
is higher when the parents have
higher estimate of a child’s ability, and/or when the school environment is favorable, i,e,
∂2θ
j
0
∂Rcj∂φ˜j
> 0, and
∂2θ
j
0
∂Rcj∂qj
> 0.17 The condition that θj
0
> 0 is satisfied in all the cases
we consider below in India and China. The upshot of the above discussion is that when we
plot two functions θj
0
(Rcj) for different ability and school quality, the curve corresponding
to higher ability estimate and better school must lie above the other curve at each positive
value of returns to schooling (see Figures F1.IU and F1.IR below).
When we superimpose the estimates of the intercepts and returns to education in this
graph, we can infer whether the upper curve refers to the sons or daughters. For illustration,
we consider two cases in (i) Figure F1.IU: θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
, and (ii) Figure F1.IR: θˆd
0
< θˆs
0
. For
brevity, we discuss Figure F1.IU in more detail, and leave Figure F1.IR to the readers. In
Figure F1.IU, the θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
curve is drawn as a horizontal line, and it is clear that the returns
to education corresponding to the higher θˆ0 curve must be lower. As discussed in some
detail above, returns to education is lower for sons in both India and China which implies
16It is important to appreciate that the inference about the mechanisms refer to the whole population
of interest, rather than a subset.
17The effects of pure son preference on (
∂θj
0
∂Rcj
), however, is not unambiguous without additional restric-
tions on the curvature of the consumption sub-utility function (α2).
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that the upper curve must refer to the sons. This implies that if the estimated intercepts
of the investment equation do not vary across gender, then the evidence would imply that
the parents underestimate a girl’s cognitive ability, and/or the girls face significant gender-
specific constraints in the school.
(3.4) Discussion
Many existing studies on intergenerational educational mobility in developing countries
share two features. First, all of the published empirical studies on intergenerational educa-
tional mobility we are aware of use a linear intergenerational persistence equation. Second,
the implicit theoretical model assumes that the primary source of intergenerational link
in educational attainment is financial investment by parents in children’s schooling, with
special emphasis on the roles of credit constraint and returns to education. Although a
primary focus of Becker-Tomes (1979, 1986) model was the implications of optimal parental
financial investment on children’s education for intergenerational transmission of inequal-
ity, they also emphasized the link across generations due to factors such as cultural capital
of a family. Following Becker et al. (2015, 2018), the cultural capital is represented by the
direct effect of father’s education on son’s schooling.
The theoretical analysis above clarifies the assumptions implicit in the linear CEF used
almost universally in the empirical literature on intergenerational educational mobility. A
linear intergenerational persistence equation implies that ψj
2
= θj
1
(
δ
j
5
− δ
j
2
θ
j
1
)
− δ
j
4
= 0. We
have ψj
2
= 0 when there are no diminishing returns or complementarity in the human capital
production function; i.e., δj
5
= δj
2
= δj
4
= 0. We call this the “linear model”, as the CEF
is necessarily linear in this case. It is easy to check that in the linear model, parental bias
against girls irrespective of the form it takes does not affect relative mobility (as measured
by intergenerational regression coefficient IGRC), its effects are captured by the intercept
of the linear CEF alone. However, we can also have a linear CEF as a special case of the
more general quadratic model; this happens when, as a matter of chance, the convexity due
to complementarity approximately cancels out the diminishing returns. When estimating
intergenerational schooling persistence, significant differences in the IGRCs for sons and
daughters (ψˆd
1
̸= ψˆs
1
) should, in general, be interpreted as evidence that the underlying
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model is likely to be quadratic, even though the CEF is approximately linear. If the
evidence does not reject a linear CEF (ψˆ2 = 0), one would be more confident that this
reflects an underlying linear model when the evidence from the investment equation also
does not reject constant returns and separability, implying θd
1
= θs
1
. It is unlikely to have
δ
j
5
> 0; δj
2
> 0 and then the different parameter values to align in a way to satisfy θd
1
= θs
1
along with the conditions that ψj
2
= 0 for j = d, s.18
When data reject the linear CEF in favor of a quadratic CEF, we do not have a constant
relative mobility measure like IGRC; the marginal effect of father’s education varies across
the education distribution. We call it “intergenerational marginal effect” or IGME for
short:
IGME(Hp) = ψ1 + 2ψ
j
2
Hp
. In the empirical analysis, we will provide estimates of IGME at focal points of father’s
education distribution: no schooling, primary (5 years in India, and 6 years in China),
secondary (9 years in China and 10 years in India), and college (16 years of schooling). We
denote the marginal effect for the children born to parents with no schooling as IGME0,
and so on. As a measure of absolute mobility, we provide estimates of expected years
of schooling conditional on father’s schooling at these focal points of father’s schooling
distribution.19 The expected years of schooling for the children born to parents with no
schooling is denoted as ES0, and so on. The father’s with no schooling is an important
group for our analysis, as the proportion is substantial in our data set, especially in India,
and, more important, these are likely to be the poorest of the households.
18Note that even with constant returns and no complementarity, we can get ψd
1
̸= ψs
1
if girls face
significant constraints in the schools.
19This definition of absolute mobility is similar to that of Chetty et al. (2014), although the interpretation
is somewhat different when the CEF is not linear. There is a different concept of absolute mobility adopted
by many authors where the focus is on whether a child attains higher education than his/her parents. For
a discussion of the limitations of this concept in empirical application to developing countries where 20-40
percent fathers have no schooling, please see Emran and Shilpi (2019). Equally important, we are not
aware of any economic model that yields this alternative empirical specification of absolute mobility.
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(4) Data
(4.1) Data for China: CFPS (2016, 2010)
The data for estimating the intergenerational mobility of education in China come from
China Family Panel Study (CFPS)- 2016 wave. In order to match children-parents pairs
irrespective of residency status at the time of the survey, we take advantage of the Family
Member Module, which has an innovative T-Tables design feature. As discussed in Xie
and Hu (2014), the T-Tables in CFPS consist of three tables - T1, T2, and T3. Table
T1 (on family members living together) and Table T2 (on immediate relatives not living
together) record the basic socio-demographic characteristics of every family member and
her immediate relatives (parents, children and spouses) who are not living with them. Table
T2 (on relations) identifies the relations of all the family members and the corresponding
relations between T1 and T3 members. Therefore, three tables jointly present a complete
family network, and most importantly, allow us to avoid truncation of the sample.
More specifically, in order to identify all the children-fathers pairs, we take the follow-
ing steps. For each individual currently living in the family, own education and father’s
education are directly available in the Family Member module irrespective of whether the
father is coresident at the time of the survey. This subsumes two cases involving three
generations. (i) If such an individual is the household head (or head’s spouse) who lives in
the family, their parents are matched, irrespective of whether they are co-resident or not.
(ii) If such an individual is household head’s (or head’s spouse’s) child, who lives in the
family, the child’s parents are of course matched, i.e. they are household head and head’s
spouse. However, step 1 misses the following case: if household head’s (or head’s spouse’s)
child is currently living outside. An important advantage of the CFPS survey is that it col-
lected data on such nonresident children. In the second step, we include these nonresident
children in the sample. Our estimation sample thus includes both the nonresident parents
of household head and spouse, and also their nonresident children.
The summary statistics for various estimation samples are reported in Table T1.U for
the urban households and Table T1.R for the rural households; the upper panel in each
Table corresponds to China, and the bottom panel to India. For China, the main estimation
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sample for the analysis of intergenerational mobility consists of children 18-35 years of age
in 2016, and the estimation samples for the investment equation are 6-22 and 8-23 years
in the 2010 round of the panel. This age range is chosen so that the age cohorts in the
investment equation have substantial overlap with the age cohorts in the mobility analysis.
In CFPS-2016 for the 18-35 age cohorts, the mean schooling of fathers is 7.65 in sons sub-
sample and 7.67 in daughters sub-samples in the urban areas according to Table T1.U. The
average schooling of sons is 11.17 years, and 11.18 years for daughters. However, there is
a gender gap in the average schooling attainment in rural China: 9.2 (sons) years and 8.7
(daughters) (see Table T1.R, upper panel). The average education expenditure is higher
for daughters in the urban estimation samples, but favors the sons in the rural samples.
(4.2) Data for India: IHDS (2012, 2005) and NSS (1995)
The data for estimating the intergenerational mobility of education in India come from
India Human Development Survey (IHDS)-2012. The construction of matched children
and parents pairs are slightly different between sons and daughters. To generate matched
son-father pairs, we follow Azam and Bhatt (2015) closely (see the Table 8 in Azam and
Bhatt (2015)). The only difference is that we are using wave 2 (2012) while Azam and
Bhatt (2015) use wave 1 (2005) of IHDS panel data. For all household heads, their father’s
education information are available directly in the household module, irrespective of a
father’s residency status at the time of the survey. The comparison between our sample
using IHDS-2012 to Azam and Bhatt’s sample using IHDS-2005 is documented in the online
appendix Table A1.S. To generate matched daughter-father pairs, we follow Azam (2016)
closely (see the Table 1 in Azam (2016)). Since Azam (2016) also use IHDS-2012 data, we
can compare our sample precisely, as shown in the online appendix Table A1.D.
The summary statistics for our various estimation samples for IHDS-2012 (for inter-
generational mobility estimation), and IHDS-2005 and NSS-1995 (for estimation of the
investment equation) are reported in the lower panels of Tables T1.U (for the urban plus
rural sample), T1.R (for rural sample). The mean education of fathers in urban areas is
6.64 years in sons sub-sample, and 6.44 years in daughters sub-sample of the main estima-
tion sample for intergenerational mobility (18-35 year old children in 2012). The average
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schooling is 10 years for sons and 9.36 for daughters. In the rural sample, the average
education of fathers is much lower; 3.90 years (sons sub-sample) and 3.83 (daughters sub-
sample). The gender gap in average schooling is also much more pronounced in the rural
areas; 8.13 years (sons) vs. 6.24 years (daughters). The average educational expenditure
in IHDS-2005 is higher for sons and it is true irrespective of geographic location and for
both the estimation samples (6-22 year old) and (8-23 year old). The bias in educational
expenditure against girls is also observed in the NSS-1995 data.
(5) Empirical Results
The empirical estimates of the mobility and investment equations discussed below report
robust standard errors. However, we also estimate the standard errors clustering at different
levels: district and state levels for India, and county (only for investment) and province
levels for China. We cannot cluster the standard errors at the county level for the mobility
estimates for China, as the county location is not available for the non-resident members of
a household. The estimated clustered standard errors are reported in the online appendix.
All the main conclusions based on the robust standard errors, however, remain intact when
we use clustered standard errors instead. If and when clustering makes a difference in
inference, we will note that in the following discussion.
(5.I) Intergenerational Mobility in India: Evidence and Interpretations
(5.I.1) Urban India
The estimates of the effects of father’s schooling on children’s schooling in urban India
are reported in the upper panel of Table T2.IU.20 The first two columns contain the evidence
from a linear CEF which provides estimates comparable to the existing literature where
linearity is a maintained assumption. The IGRC estimate is higher for the daughters,
suggesting that the daughters face significantly lower relative mobility in urban India.
Although almost all of the existing studies on India focus primarily (or exclusively) on
relative mobility, it has been emphasized in the recent literature that inter-group analysis of
intergenerational mobility based solely on relative mobility can be misleading, as different
20The Table numbers are indexed by country and location. For example, T2.IU stands for Table 2 for
the Indian Urban sample, and so on.
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groups may be converging to different steady states defined in part by the intercept term
(Hertz (2005), Mazumder (2014), Torche (2015a), Emran et al. (2019), Emran and Shilpi
(2019)). The estimates for the linear CEF show that the intercept for the daughters is
lower. The daughters attain lower education than the sons when the father has less than
16 years of schooling, but the gender advantage flips in favor of girls for the children of the
fathers with higher education.
The estimates from a linear CEF provide suggestive evidence in favor of the widely-
held notion of strong gender bias against girls in India. However, the evidence rejects
the assumption of linearity; the estimates of the quadratic term in columns (4) (for sons)
and (5) (for daughters) in Table T2.IU are negative and statistically significant at the
1 percent level. The quadratic coefficient is numerically larger for the daughters, but
the difference is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Consistent with the
econometric evidence, the nonparametric LOWESS plots of son’s and daughter’s schooling
against father’s schooling in urban India suggest a concave relation (see Figure F2.IU). The
evidence that the CEF is concave implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis: δ5 = 0,
suggesting the absence of any significant complementarity between father’s education and
financial investment in urban India.
The estimated quadratic CEFs using the coefficients in Table T2.IU are plotted in Figure
F3.IU and show that the expected schooling attainment conditional on father’s education
is higher for sons, except at the right tail of the distribution of father’s schooling. As a
measure of absolute mobility, we report estimated expected years of schooling conditional
on a father having 0, 5, 10 and 16 years of schooling in the bottom panel of Table T2.IU. The
daughters born to low educated fathers face significant disadvantage in term of expected
schooling attainment (the ES0 estimates are: 5.8 (daughters) vs. 6.8 (sons)), but there is
no gender difference when the father has college education (the ES16 estimate is 13.8 for
both daughters and sons).21
For relative mobility, the estimated IGMEs in the bottom panel of Table T2.IU show
that the persistence is much stronger for the girls born to fathers with low education
21The ES0 estimates refer to the children of fathers with zero years of schooling. The proportion of
fathers with zero schooling in urban India is 24 percent in our data.
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(IGME0 estimates are: 0.65 (daughters) vs. 0.55 (sons)), but, again, the gender difference
becomes negligible when the father has college or more education: (IGME16 estimates
are: 0.33 (sons) vs. 0.35 (daughters)). Please see Figure F4.IU. The evidence on absolute
and relative mobility thus favors the idea that gender difference in educational attainment
may primarily be a product of low education (and thus low permanent income) of parents.
This also brings into focus the incorrect conclusions from the standard linear CEF that
the daughters face less relative mobility throughout the parental schooling distribution.
A researcher focused exclusively on the linear CEF would completely miss the gender
convergence in relative mobility at the right tail of father’s schooling distribution.
Sources of Gender Bias
The extended Becker-Tomes model in section (2) above highlights parental educational
investment as a major mechanism through which inequality persists across generations.
Thus, it is informative to look first at the estimates of the investment equation to under-
stand the economic mechanisms at play. The estimates of θ0 and θ1 for urban India are
reported in Table T3.IU, using IHDS 2005 and NSS 1995 data. We report estimates for
two age groups of children for each data set to ensure robustness of the conclusions.22
The evidence suggests strongly that θˆd
1
< θˆs
1
; the interaction of father’s education with
the daughter dummy is negative across the board, and is statistically significant at the
10 percent or lower level in 7 out of 8 cases.23 The estimates for the intercept shows a
contrasting picture: the daughter dummy is not statistically significant at the 10 percent
level in 6 out of 8 cases. The evidence cannot reject the null hypothesis that θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
.
The estimates for the educational investment equation and the quadratic intergenera-
22We also used other age groups for estimating the investment equation. The conclusions reached in this
paper are robust to such alternative age samples.
23This is consistent with the existing evidence on gender bias against girls in educational expenditure
in India (see Kingdon (2007), Azam and Kingdon (2013)). Azam and Kingdon (2013) find significant pro
male bias for the 10 years or older children, using the IHDS 2005 data. They point out that the focus
on educational expenditure misses substantial gender bias against girls in terms of schooling continuation
decisions. When gender bias manifests as early drop-out of daughters from school, this is captured by
lower educational attainment in our data. Datta and Kingdon (2019) use 1995 and 2014 NSS data and
find that the role played by gender bias in educational expenditure (the intensive margin) has increased
substantially over time in India. Note, however, that the existing evidence while suggestive does not provide
estimates of the effects of father’s education on children’s educational expenditure which is the focus of the
investment equation in intergenerational mobility analysis.
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tional persistence equation can be summarized as the following binary relations (denoting
an estimated parameter with a hat):
MOBILITY
ψˆd
0
< ψˆs
0
; ψˆd
1
> ψˆs
1
ψˆd
2
= ψˆs
2
; ψˆd
2
, ψˆs
2
< 0
(15)
INV ESTMENT θˆd
1
< θˆs
1
θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
(16)
These binary relations impose restrictions on plausible explanations for the observed
differences between the sons and the daughters. We combine these with the evidence on
gender differences in returns to education to understand the role played by different forms
of gender bias discussed in the theoretical section.
Interpreting the Evidence: The Investment Equation
As noted earlier, the evidence on functional form fails to reject the null hypothesis that
δ5 = 0 in urban India, and we trace out the implications of the binary relations in (16)
above with this restriction imposed. However, some of important conclusions regarding the
mechanisms of gender bias discussed below hold irrespective of whether δ5 = 0. Using
equation (12) from the theoretical model, θˆd
1
< θˆs
1
implies the following inequality:
δ˜d
2
σdRcd > δ˜s
2
σsRcs (17)
A substantial body of evidence suggests that, in urban India, the returns to education in
the labor market are higher for daughters, especially at the secondary and higher secondary
levels (see Duraisamy (2002), Aslam et al. (2010)).24 For a summary of the available
estimates of returns to education in Urban India, please see the first two columns of Table
24However, there is also substantial evidence that educated women, especially married women, withdraw
from the labor market and devote to home production such as child care and home tutoring (Afridi
et al. (2018)). The expected returns to education for daughters Rcd capture both labor market and non-
market returns (expressed in shadow prices), including the returns in the marriage market, and from home
production, for example, in the form of higher quality grand children. If educated women withdraw from
the labor market even though the returns are higher than that of men, it implies that the shadow returns
from non-market sources are even higher. Thus the expected total returns for women are likely to be higher
than that suggested by the estimates of labor market returns.
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T4.I. We focus on the returns to education at secondary (10 years of schooling) and higher
secondary (12 years of schooling) levels, given that the average education in urban India in
our data set is 9.93 years for the sons, and 9.43 years for the daughters.25 Since Rcd > Rcs,
inequality (17) is satisfied even if we assume that δ˜d
2
σd = δ˜s
2
σs. Clearly, this last equality is
consistent with no gender bias by the parents.
Turning to the intercept estimates from the investment equation, the theory implies the
following relation:
2α2Y
p
0
+ δ˜d
1
σdRcd − α1
2
{
α2 + δ˜d2σ
dRcd
} = 2α2Y
p
0
+ δ˜s
1
σsRcs − α1
2
{
α2 + δ˜s2σ
sRcs
} (18)
An immediate observation is that it is not possible to satisfy (18) if there are no gender
biases (i.e, if δ˜d
1
= δ˜s
1
, δ˜d
2
= δ˜s
2
, and σd = σs ), because Rcd > Rcs.
The fact that there is no significant differences in the intercepts implies that urban India
corresponds to the case depicted in Figure F1.IU in section 2.3 above. An inspection of
Figure F1.IU shows that the returns to education must be smaller for the curve with higher
(φ˜j) and (qj). Since the returns to education is smaller for the sons (see Table T4.I), the
higher curve must refer to the sons, implying that the parents have systematically higher
ability estimate for the sons, and/or the girls face substantial hurdles in the schools. It is
important to note that these conclusions hold irrespective of the value of δ5.
The above analysis of the mechanisms of gender bias in the observed educational in-
vestment in urban India is based on the assumption that the parents are aware of the fact
that returns to education is, in fact, higher for the daughters. One might wonder what
are the implications of the alternative assumption that, despite the evidence, the parents
believe that the returns from education is lower for daughters. If Rcd < Rcs, then an
analysis based on Figure 3.IU suggests the following conclusions: (i) parents believe that
the daughters have more academic ability, and (ii) the daughters enjoy a more favorable
school environment. When we combine these with the evidence above that θˆd
1
> θˆs
1
, we get
the conclusion that the parents must hold pure daughter preference. All these conclusions
25Most of the estimates of returns to education in India are based on NSS data which do not provide
years of schooling information, only the highest completed level (primary, secondary etc).
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seem implausible given the accumulated evidence on gender bias against girls in India in
economics and sociology literature.
The discussion above suggests that the evidence on the functional form of the mobility
equation, returns to education, and the investment equation taken together cannot reject
the following joint null hypothesis: (i) complementarity between financial investment and
father’s education is not important in urban India, i.e., δ5 = 0, (ii) parents systematically
underestimate the ability of daughters, and (iii) the daughters face unfavorable school
environment. In what follows, we confront the estimates from the mobility equation to check
whether this set of null hypothesis is sufficient to explain the pattern of the inequalities in
(15) above.
Learning about Gender Bias: The Intergenerational Mobility Equation
We begin with the estimates of the the quadratic coefficients. When interpreted in
terms of the theoretical analysis of section (2.2) above, ψˆd
2
= ψˆs
2
implies the following:
δd
2
(
θˆd
1
)2
+ δd
4
= δs
2
(
θˆs
1
)2
+ δs
4
(19)
From the estimates of the investment equation, we know that θˆd
1
< θˆs
1
, which implies
that equation (19) cannot be satisfied without some form of bias against daughters that
works through either δ2 and/or δ4. It is important to recognize that δ2 and δ4 are the
parameters of the “true” production function, and thus do not depend on parental bias,
but are affected by bias in the school. However, unfavorable school environment found
earlier do not help satisfy equation (19). This follows from the observation that, starting
at no bias, i.e.,
(
qd = qs = q
)
, a lower school quality for the girls
(
qd < q
)
reduces the value
of δd
2
(
θˆd
1
)2
, while a higher school quality for the boys (qs > q) increases δs
2
(
θˆs
1
)2
. The
upshot of the above discussion is that, to satisfy equation (19), we need gender bias in
the form of δd
4
> δs
4
, implying that the diminishing returns to the direct effect of father’s
education are stronger for daughters. Recalling that the evidence earlier also suggests
stronger diminishing returns to financial investment for daughters, the daughters in urban
India thus seem to face stronger diminishing returns at double margins.
We next turn to the implications of the inequality ψˆd
1
> ψˆs
1
. From the theory in section
22
(2.2), this inequality implies the following (with δ5 = 0):
θˆd
1
(
δd
1
− 2δd
2
θˆd
0
)
+ δd
3
> θˆs
1
(
δs
1
− 2δs
2
θˆs
0
)
+ δs
3
(20)
According to the educational investment estimates discussed above, θˆd
1
< θˆs
1
and θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
.
Again, it is important to keep in mind that δd
1
and δd
2
are parameters of the true production
function. The evidence on the investment equation discussed above shows that the girls
face unfavorable school environment, i.e., qd < qs, implying that δd
1
< δs
1
and δd
2
> δs
2
. This
implies that θˆd
1
(
δd
1
− 2δd
2
θˆd
0
)
< θˆs
1
(
δs
1
− 2δs
2
θˆs
0
)
. It is thus necessary to have δd
3
> δs
3
for
inequality (20) to hold. When considered along with the evidence earlier that δd
4
> δs
4
, this
suggests that the marginal direct effect of father’s education
(
δ
j
3
− 2δj
4
Hp
)
is higher for the
daughters of fathers with low education, but lower when father’s education is high enough.
Since θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
, the inequality of intercepts of the mobility equation, i.e., ψˆd
0
< ψˆs
0
implies
the following (denote the common value by θˆc
0
):
θˆc
0
[
δd
1
− δs
1
]
<
(
θˆc
0
)2 [
δd
2
− δs
2
]
(21)
It is easy to check that bias in the school against girls found earlier i.e.,
(
qd < qs
)
, is
necessary and sufficient for inequality (21) to hold.
(5.I.2) Rural India
The estimates of intergenerational persistence in schooling in rural India are reported
in Table T2.IR. The pattern of estimates from the linear CEF is similar to that in urban
India; the IGRC estimate is larger for the daughters implying lower relative mobility, while
the intercept is smaller. A comparison with the estimates for urban India shows that the
IGRC estimates do not vary significantly across rural vs. urban areas, but the intercept for
girls in rural areas is substantially lower. Also, the difference in the intercepts between sons
and daughters is larger in rural areas, a 50 percent higher intercept for the sons, compared
to only a 16 percent higher intercept in the urban areas. Although useful as a benchmark
comparable to the existing estimates in the literature, these preliminary estimates are,
however, contingent on the maintained assumption that the CEF is linear.
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The estimates from the quadratic specification for rural India shows that the coefficient
of the quadratic term is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, for both the sons
and the daughters, providing clear evidence that the null hypothesis of a linear CEF is
rejected. The estimated quadratic coefficient is negative, suggesting that both the CEFs
are concave, similar to what we observed in urban India (see also the Lowess plots in
Figure F2.IR). However, there is an important gender difference between the urban and
rural India; the degree of concavity is similar for sons irrespective of location (the estimate
of the quadratic coefficient is -0.007 in both rural and urban samples), but the quadratic
coefficient is substantially larger in magnitude for daughters in rural areas. In fact, the
null hypothesis of equality of quadratic coefficients can be rejected in rural India at the 1
percent level, indicating that the girls face especially strong forces of diminishing returns
in the villages.
The estimates of mobility in the bottom panel of Table T2.IR show that the girls face
lower mobility, both in terms of absolute and relative measures, when they are born to low
educated parents. The expected years of schooling remains consistently lower for girls, even
when the father has college education; a girl growing up in rural India expect a year less
schooling on average. For the lowest educated households, the gender gap is almost 2 years
of expected schooling. The estimates of relative mobility show that the intergenerational
persistence is substantially higher for the daughters born into households with low educated
fathers (compare the IGME0 estimate of 0.52 (sons) with 0.64 (daughters)).
26 The gender
difference in IGME, however, becomes negligible for the households with highly educated
fathers (college educated). Please see Figure F4.IR.
Sources of Gender Bias in Rural India
The estimates of the parameters of the educational investment in Table T3.IR show that
the daughters receive significantly less educational investment in rural India; the daughter
dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent or lower levels, implying
that θˆd
0
< θˆs
0
. The evidence is robust across alternative data sets (IHDS 2005 and NSS
1995) and consistent with existing evidence in the context of India (Azam and Kingdon
26About 40 percent of fathers in rural India in our data have zero schooling).
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(2013)).27
The evidence on the marginal effect of father’s higher education in Table T3.IR also
suggests a smaller effect for girls; the interaction of daughter dummy with father’s schooling
is negative, and significant at the 10 percent level in 5 out of 8 cases. However, the evidence
is weaker than that in urban India, because only one of the estimates is significant at the
5 percent level, and the magnitude of the interaction effect is also smaller.28 Moreover,
the interaction is significant only in 4 cases when we use standard errors clustered at the
district level (see Table A3.IR in online appendix).
Putting together the estimates of investment equation with those from the intergener-
ational mobility equation, we have the following binary relations in rural India:
MOBILITY
ψˆd
0
< ψˆs
0
; ψˆd
1
> ψˆs
1∣∣∣ψˆd2
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣ψˆs2
∣∣∣ ; ψˆd2 < 0, ψˆs2 < 0
(22)
INV ESTMENT θˆd
1
≦ θˆs
1
θˆd
0
< θˆs
0
(23)
Since the CEF is concave for both sons and daughters, we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that δ5 = 0. In what follows, the discussion assumes that this restriction holds.
Implications of the Investment Equation Estimates
We first consider the evidence on the slope of the investment function. Given the uncer-
tainty regarding the evidence discussed above (θˆd
1
≦ θˆs
1
), the inference regarding gender bias
depends critically on one’s interpretation. If one interprets the evidence as a lower slope
for the girls (i.e., θˆd
1
< θˆs
1
), then we have exactly the same results as in urban India, and as
noted before, the slope estimates are consistent with no parental bias because returns to
education is higher for girls (see Table T4.I for the evidence on returns to education in rural
India).29 In contrast, if the conclusion is that there is no strong evidence of difference in the
27Azam and Kingdon (2013) show that the gender bias against girls in education expenditure is larger
in rural areas in India. We, however, restate the caveat that the existing evidence does not relate to the
question of how educational expenditure varies with the education of a father.
28In urban India, the interaction effect is significant at the 1 percent level in 2 cases, and at the 5 percent
level in 4 cases.
29Again, if we assume that the parents are not aware of the fact that returns are higher for girls, and
believe the opposite, then the evidence from the investment equation implies implausible conclusions such
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marginal effect of father’s education across gender of children, then we have θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
. This,
in turn, implies δ˜d
2
σdRcd = δ˜s
2
σsRcs. Since Rcd > Rcs, we must have δ˜d
2
σd < δ˜s
2
σs. Observe
that if parents underestimate a girls ability, we have δ˜d
2
> δ˜s
2
, and we can have δ˜d
2
σd < δ˜s
2
σs
only if there is pure son preference, i.e., σd < σs. We discuss below that the evidence on
the intercepts is consistent with parents underestimating a daughter’s academic ability.
Rcd > Rcs when combined with θˆd
0
< θˆs
0
provide evidence consistent with parents un-
derestimating ability of a daughter, and girls facing constraints in the school. This case is
depicted in Figure F1.IR in section 2.3 above. An inspection of the graph makes it clear
that it is not possible have θˆd
0
< θˆs
0
with Rcd > Rcs, if the upper curve in Figure F1.IR
refers to the daughters. The evidence is consistent with only the case where the upper
curve refers to sons, implying gender bias against girls in the form of lower ability estimate
and/or unfavorable school environment.30
Implications of the Intergenerational Mobility Estimates
With δ5 = 0, the evidence that
∣∣∣ψˆd2
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣ψˆs2
∣∣∣ implies the following inequality: δd2
(
θˆd
1
)2
+
δd
4
> δs
2
(
θˆs
1
)2
+ δs
4
. From the estimates of the investment equation and the discussion
above, we know that δd
2
> δs
2
because of the constraints girls face in the school. Since the
case with θˆd
1
< θˆs
1
was discussed at length for urban India, here we focus on the case when
θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
. In this case, the inequality above is satisfied without imposing any restrictions on
the relative magnitudes of the parameters δd
4
and δs
4
. Similarly, it is easy to check that the
inequality ψˆd
1
> ψˆs
1
also is not useful to sort out the role of different mechanisms of gender
bias.31 Since θˆd
0
< θˆs
0
and δd
2
> δs
2
, a sufficient condition for ψˆd
0
< ψˆs
0
to hold is that δs
1
> δd
1
but it is not necessary. From the evidence in the immediately preceding section, we know
that
(
qd < qs
)
which implies δs
1
> δd
1
.
as parents have pure daughter preference in rural India.
30If the parents believe that the returns to education are in fact lower for girls, then it implies that
the parents underestimate the ability of boys, and also that the boys face gender-based constraints in the
school.
31This follows from the observation that θd
0
θd
1
< θs
0
θs
1
but δd
2
> δs
2
.
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(5.C) Intergenerational Mobility in China: Evidence and Interpretations
(5.C.1) Urban China
The estimates of the effects of father’s schooling on children’s schooling in urban China
are reported in Table T2.CU. The estimates for the linear CEF show that, similar to urban
India, the intercept is lower for girls but the IGRC estimate is larger. With linearity
a maintained assumption, the evidence thus suggests that the girls face lower relative
mobility in urban China, but the expected level of schooling are, in fact, higher for girls
when father’s education is higher than 7 years of schooling.
The evidence on the null hypothesis of a linear CEF shows that it is a good approxima-
tion for the daughters in urban China, but not for the sons. The estimates in Table T2.CU
show that, for sons, the quadratic term is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and
perhaps more strikingly, it bears a positive sign, implying that the CEF of sons’ schooling
is convex. The convexity is also apparent in the Lowess plot (please see Figure F2.CU). The
evidence on functional form in urban China is thus different from the concave CEF found
earlier in urban India. The estimated convex CEF using the coefficients in Table T2.CU
for sons is plotted in Figure F3.CU along with the linear CEF for the daughters. The CEF
plots show very different pattern of mobility when compared to the urban India case; the
sons born to fathers at the tails of the schooling distribution enjoy higher expected years
of schooling, while the daughters have slight advantage in the middle of the distribution.
This is reflected in the absolute mobility estimates in the bottom panel of Table T2.CU.
The relative mobility estimates in the bottom panel of Table T2.CU show a large gender
difference in terms of magnitude. The intergenerational persistence is very low for the sons
born to fathers with no schooling (0.09), but the daughters face much higher persistence
(0.35). The pattern flips when the fathers have more than 9 years of schooling (junior
secondary). The IGME estimate for sons is 0.56 when the father has college education (16
years schooling), while IGME remains the same (0.35) for daughters given the linear CEF.
Please see Figure F4.CU. This is in sharp contrast to the urban India where the gender
difference in educational persistence becomes negligible for the most educated parents.
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Sources of Gender Differences in Urban China
To understand the role played by parental financial investment in children’s education,
we utilize the data from the first round of the CFPS survey (2010) to estimate the pa-
rameters of the investment equation (i.e., equation (10) above) in Table T3.CU and test
the equality of the coefficients across gender. The evidence in Table T3.CU is clear that
parental financial investment in schooling does not depend on the gender of a child; we can-
not reject the null hypothesis that θd
0
= θs
0
and θd
1
= θs
1
. These conclusions are consistent
with the other existing evidence (see, for example, Tsui and Rich (2002)).
The estimates of the parameters of investment function and the estimates of the mobility
equation discussed above can be summarized in the following binary relations for sons vs.
daughters:
MOBILITY
ψˆd
0
< ψˆs
0
; ψˆd
1
> ψˆs
1
ψˆd
2
< ψˆs
2
; ψˆd
2
= 0, ψˆs
2
> 0
(24)
INV ESTMENT θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
(25)
We first look at the implications of the evidence on the functional form of the intergen-
erational schooling persistence regressions. The evidence of convexity in the case of sons
(i.e., ψˆs
2
> 0) implies that we can reject the null hypothesis of δs
5
= 0 in favor of δs
5
> 0.
This is interesting evidence for Becker et al. (2015, 2018) hypothesis that higher educated
fathers are more efficient in financial investment in education.32 The linearity of the CEF
for the daughters, however, cannot be interpreted as evidence in favor of the linear model.
With δs
5
> 0, it is difficult to satisfy θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
if δd
5
= 0.
Learning from the Investment Equation
Two pieces of evidence in urban China are similar to that in urban India: (i) the returns
to education are higher for girls (see Table T4.C), and (ii) θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
. As discussed in section
(4.1) above, these together imply that parents underestimate a daughter’s academic ability
32We are not aware of any other analysis of intergenerational educational persistence that provides such
evidence in favor of the Becker et al. (2015, 2018) convexity hypothesis in a developing country.
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(
φ˜d < φ˜s
)
, and the daughter’s also face disadvantages in the school
(
qd < qs
)
.33
However, the evidence that θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
does not add to our understanding without bringing
in additional restrictions imposed by the estimates of the parameters of the intergenera-
tional mobility equation. This is because, in contrast to urban India, the evidence on
functional form of the CEFs reject the null hypothesis that δ5 = 0.
34 So we turn to the
evidence from the intergenerational mobility equation below to see if that helps narrow
down the possible explanations.
Learning from the Intergenerational Mobility Equation
Since θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
, the evidence that ψˆd
2
< ψˆs
2
implies the following inequality (denoting the
common value of θj
1
by θc
1
):
(
δs
4
− δd
4
)
< θc
1
(
δs
5
− δd
5
)
+ (θc
1
)2
(
δd
2
− δs
2
)
(26)
Now, note that
(
qd < qs
)
imply that
(
δd
2
− δs
2
)
> 0, and from the functional form
evidence we know that
(
δs
5
− δd
5
)
> 0. So a sufficient condition for inequality (24) to be
valid is that
(
δs
4
− δd
4
)
≤ 0, but it is not necessary. This is in contrast to the evidence on
urban India where it is necessary that
(
δs
4
− δd
4
)
< 0.
Next, we consider the evidence ψˆd
1
> ψˆs
1
which implies the following inequality when
combined with the evidence that θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
and θˆd
0
= θˆs
0
:
(
δd
3
− δs
3
)
> θc
1
(
δs
1
− δd
1
)
+ 2θc
0
θc
1
(
δd
2
− δs
2
)
(27)
A necessary condition for inequality (25) to be satisfied is that δd
3
> δs
3
because when(
qd < qs
)
we have
(
δs
1
− δd
1
)
> 0 and
(
δd
2
− δs
2
)
> 0. This is similar to what we found earlier
for urban India.35
33The implication of the alternative assumption about parental belief regarding returns to education are
also the same.
34Note that with δ5 > 0, we cannot sign the slope of the θˆ
j
1
(Rcj) function.
35But, unlike urban India, we cannot determine whether the marginal direct effect of father’s education(
δj
3
− 2δj
4
Hp
)
is higher for daughters with low educated fathers because the evidence does not pin down
the sign of
(
δs
4
− δd
4
)
in the case of urban China.
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Finally, the inequality of the intercepts of the mobility regressions implies the following
for urban China: (
δd
1
− θc
0
δd
2
)
< (δs
1
− θc
0
δs
2
) (28)
This is similar to what we had before for urban India, and as noted earlier, inequal-
ity (26) is satisfied when the daughters face gender-based constraints at the school, i.e.,(
qd < qs
)
.
(5.C.2) Rural China
The estimates for intergenerational persistence in schooling in rural China are presented
in Table T2.CR. The first striking thing to notice is that the evidence on the functional
form cannot reject the null hypothesis of linearity for both the sons and the daughters; this
is in contrast to the other three cases we considered above in sections (4.1), (4.2) and (5.1).
However, note that the linear CEF estimates show substantial difference in the IGRC of
sons and daughters; the daughters face higher intergenerational persistence in schooling. As
discussed in section (2.3) above, the estimated CEF can be approximately linear even if the
underlying model is a quadratic one. Following the discussion in section (2.1), we can check
the plausibility of the linear model with evidence from the investment equation: by testing
whether the null hypothesis that θd
1
= θs
1
is rejected by the data. The evidence on the
investment equation parameters in Table T3.CR suggests that the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected at the 5 percent level. This is also consistent with other available evidence on
the lack of any significant gender differences in educational investment in the economic and
sociology literature on rural China (Hannum et al. (2009)). Taken together, the evidence
from the investment and mobility equations thus suggests that the linear model provides a
plausible characterization of the data in rural China.
Given a linear CEF, the estimate of relative mobility does not vary across the distribu-
tion of parental schooling (Figure F4.CR): the IGRC is 0.27 for sons, and 0.33 for daughters,
suggesting much lower relative mobility for the daughters. The estimate of absolute mobil-
ity, on the other hand, depends on the level of parental schooling. The estimated absolute
mobility (expected years of schooling) in the lower panel of Table T2.CR shows that the
daughters are at a disadvantage when the father’s schooling is less that 13 years, but the
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advantage flips when the father has college education. This implies that, even though the
girls face stronger intergenerational persistence across the board, they in fact leave the boys
behind in terms of schooling attainment when the father is sufficiently well-educated. The
estimated CEFs are plotted in Figure F3.CR.
Mechanisms of Gender Bias: Interpretations
When the correct model is, in fact, linear (no significant diminishing returns or comple-
mentarity), then the only mechanism that can lead to different relative mobility (IGRCs)
for sons vs. daughters is gender-specific constraints in school. The estimates on relative mo-
bility (IGRC) in Table T2.CR thus imply that an important source of gender bias against
girls in rural China is unfavorable school environment.
However, with a linear model, the theory also implies that the effects of parental or labor
market bias would be reflected in the intercept estimates of the investment and mobility
equations. The estimates of the intercept of the investment equation in Table T3.CR show
that θˆd
0
> θˆs
0
. Combined with the evidence that θˆd
1
= θˆs
1
, the estimates of the investment
equation thus suggest no gender bias against girls in rural China, if anything financial
investment favors the daughters.36
θˆd
0
> θˆs
0
implies the following inequality: δ˜d
1
σdRcd > δ˜s
1
σsRcs. Table T4.C provides a
summary of the available estimates of returns to education in rural China showing evidence
in favor of Rcd > Rcs.37 These two inequalities are, however, consistent with a variety of
hypothesis about parental attitude towards sons vs. daughters and do not help us narrow
down the explanations.
The intercept estimates of the mobility equation shows that ψˆd
0
< ψˆs
0
, which implies
δd
1
θd
0
< δs
1
θs
0
. Since θd
0
> θs
0
, this implies that δd
1
< δs
1
. This last inequality holds when
the girls face constraints in the school. Thus, the only conclusion we can reach is that
the girls in rural China face significant bias in the schools, but do not find any evidence
that the parents discriminate against girls when choosing educational investment. This
36This is consistent with other available evidence. See, for example, Hannum et al. (2009).
37The available estimates of returns to education for rural China suggest that the returns were very
low during the early period of economic liberalization (deBrauw and Rozelle (2008), Meng (1998)), but
the more recent evidence shows increasing returns to education with higher returns for the girls (see, for
example, Ren and Miller (2012)).
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last conclusion, in fact, is consistent with in-depth case studies reported by Hannum et al.
(2009).
(6) Robustness Checks
The empirical results on intergenerational mobility discussed so far are based on the
sample of 18-35 years age cohorts of children in the survey year. To check robustness of
the findings, we also estimated the mobility equation (14) in section (2) for alternative age
ranges. The estimates for the age cohorts 18-30 years are reported in the online appendix;
please see the Tables A2.IU.B, A2.IR.B, A2.CU.B, and A2.CR.B. The main conclusions
regarding gender differences in intergenerational educational mobility remain intact.
We also check whether the conclusions are partly due to the effects of gender bias work-
ing through endogeneous fertility choices. To this end, we estimate the mobility equation
using only the sub-sample of the first-born child, as the gender of the the first born is
usually not determined by parental preference. The CFPS survey on China is suitable for
such an analysis. But we are unable to implement this for IHDS data in India, as the
IHDS survey does not contain the information on the birth-order of the household head
and spouse. The estimates based on the first-born sample for urban and rural China are
reported in online appendix Tables A2.CU.C and A2.CR.C respectively for the 18-35 age
cohorts; the main conclusions discussed in the text above are again robust. The estimates
from the first=born sub-sample of the 18-30 age cohorts also support the main conclusions.
(7) Concluding Comments
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the implications of gender
bias against girls for intergenerational educational mobility in developing countries. We
develop a Becker-Tomes model where the parents self-finance children’s schooling because
of credit market imperfections, and the girls may face bias in the family, the school, and the
labor market. The model yields a linear conditional expectation function (CEF) under the
assumptions of constant returns and separable education production function, but delivers
sharp predictions: parental bias against girls is irrelevant for relative mobility and for the
marginal impact of parent’s education on investment in schooling. The effects of parental
bias are captured by the intercepts of the investment and mobility equations which are
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usually not the focus in the existing literature relying on a linear estimating equation. When
the education production function exhibits diminishing returns to financial investment and
complementarity between parent’s direct impact and financial investment as proposed by
Becker et al. (2015, 2018), the CEF can be concave or convex depending on the strength
of complementarity. With quadratic CEF, parental gender bias affects both relative and
absolute mobility.
We take advantage of rich household survey data from China and India to test the
above ideas. The data sets used (IHDS for India and CFPS for China) do not suffer
from sample truncation due to coresidency restrictions common in household surveys in
developing countries. Our estimates are thus free of severe truncation bias reported recently
by Emran et al. (2018) because of coresidency restrictions. The evidence shows interesting
cross-country and rural-urban differences. The CEF is concave in India irrespective of
gender and location. In contrast, the CEF is convex for sons, but linear for daughters
in urban China. In rural China, the CEF is linear for both sons and daughters. The
evidence on functional form suggests that the children face diminishing returns India, and
the girls in rural India face diminishing returns both in financial investment and parental
direct inputs to schooling. The convexity observed in urban China for sons supports the
complementarity hypothesis of Becker et al. (2018).
The girls face lower relative and absolute mobility in India when the father has low
education, but there is gender convergence at the right tail of parental schooling distribu-
tion. The relative magnitudes of the estimated parameters of the investment and mobility
equations across gender when combined with the evidence of higher returns to education
for girls help us sort out possible explanations for the observed pattern of mobility. The
evidence on rural and urban India is consistent with the hypothesis that parents system-
atically underestimate the academic ability of girls, and the girls also face significant bias
in the schools. The same mechanisms can also explain the evidence in urban China, but,
in rural China, the evidence indicates constraints in the school as the main mechanism at
work, and fails to reject the null hypothesis of no parental bias. There is some evidence
that pure son preference plays a role in educational persistence in rural India.
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Table T1.U: SUMMARY STATISTICS (URBAN SAMPLES) 
 
Full Sons Daughters 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 
CHINA 
CFPS 2016 (18-35) N=6433 N=3192 N=3241 
Father's Sch. 7.66 4.27 7.65 4.32 7.67 4.23 
Children's Sch. 11.17 3.88 11.17 3.85 11.18 3.9 
CFPS 2016 (18-30) N=4435 N=2230 N=2205 
Father's Sch. 7.8 4.2 7.8 4.23 7.79 4.17 
Children's Sch. 11.27 3.77 11.23 3.73 11.31 3.8 
CFPS 2010 (6-22) N=2784 N=1425 N=1359 
Father's Sch. 9.35 4 9.24 4 9.48 4 
Educ. Exp. 3178.11 4760.34 3014.98 4761.47 3349.16 4754.89 
No. of Children 1.2 0.72 1.18 0.67 1.21 0.76 
CFPS 2010 (8-23) N=2435 N=1251 N=1184 
Father's Sch. 9.28 3.99 9.17 4.02 9.39 3.95 
Educ. Exp. 3261.35 4990.48 3101.34 5093.39 3430.41 4875.83 
No. of Children 1.17 0.75 1.15 0.69 1.19 0.8 
 INDIA 
IHDS 2012 (18-35) N=18519 N=9449 N=9070 
Father's Sch. 6.54 5.05 6.64 4.96 6.44 5.14 
Children's Sch. 9.69 4.52 10.01 4.2 9.36 4.8 
IHDS 2012 (18-30) N=14140 N=7314 N=6826 
Father's Sch. 6.81 5 6.9 4.89 6.72 5.1 
Children's Sch. 10 4.35 10.2 4.06 9.78 4.63 
IHDS 2005 (6-22) N=13086 N=6917 N=6169 
Father's Sch. 8.55 4.68 8.52 4.71 8.59 4.65 
Educ. Exp. 3798.29 5349.04 4060.57 5657.13 3504.2 4965 
No. of Children 2.41 1.43 2.36 1.43 2.46 1.43 
IHDS 2005 (8-23) N=11051 N=5883 N=5168 
Father's Sch. 8.58 4.68 8.54 4.7 8.61 4.66 
Educ. Exp. 4082.12 5721.06 4368.01 6025.75 3756.67 5335.11 
No. of Children 2.42 1.46 2.35 1.46 2.5 1.46 
NSS 1995 (6-13) N=18689 N=10071 N=8618 
Father's Sch. 5.09 2.46 5.03 2.47 5.16 2.43 
Educ. Exp. 1101.84 1237.90 1145.16 1293.68 1051.22 1167.40 
No. of Children 2.67 1.11 2.61 1.10 2.73 1.13 
NSS 1995 (6-18) N=27819 N=15152 N=12667 
Father's Sch. 5.24 2.44 5.16 2.46 5.33 2.42 
Educ. Exp. 1338.27 1529.59 1382.00 1588.18 1285.96 1454.75 
No. of Children 2.67 1.14 2.60 1.12 2.75 1.17 
Notes: CFPS stands for China Family Panel Survey, IHDS stands for Indian Human Development Survey, and 
NSS stands for National Sample Survey. 
  
Table T1.R: SUMMARY STATISTICS (RURAL SAMPLES) 
 
 
Full Sons Daughters 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 
CHINA 
CFPS 2016 (18-35) N=8040 N=3955 N=4085 
Father's Sch. 5.9 4.27 5.93 4.29 5.88 4.26 
Children's Sch. 8.96 4.08 9.2 3.91 8.74 4.23 
CFPS 2016 (18-30) N=5647 N=2833 N=2814 
Father's Sch. 6.01 4.16 6.11 4.17 5.91 4.15 
Children's Sch. 9.4 3.93 9.53 3.75 9.26 4.1 
CFPS 2010 (6-22) N=4326 N=2224 N=2102 
Father's Sch. 6.44 3.88 6.45 3.9 6.42 3.87 
Educ. Exp. 1301.35 2386.63 1328.64 2535.81 1272.48 2218.14 
No. of Children 1.63 0.93 1.57 0.9 1.7 0.97 
CFPS 2010 (8-23) N=3632 N=1843 N=1789 
Father's Sch. 6.4 3.9 6.43 3.88 6.37 3.91 
Educ. Exp. 1432.85 2593.57 1449.28 2710.91 1415.92 2467.5 
No. of Children 1.62 0.96 1.52 0.9 1.72 1 
 
INDIA 
IHDS 2012 (18-35) N=33979 N=16957 N=17022 
Father's Sch. 3.87 4.41 3.9 4.32 3.83 4.49 
Children's Sch. 7.18 4.71 8.13 4.36 6.24 4.86 
IHDS 2012 (18-30) N=25903 N=12946 N=12957 
Father's Sch. 4.08 4.46 4.12 4.37 4.04 4.54 
Children's Sch. 7.61 4.59 8.43 4.21 6.8 4.8 
IHDS 2005 (6-22) N=23058 N=12631 N=10427 
Father's Sch. 5.58 4.58 5.47 4.61 5.71 4.55 
Educ. Exp. 1489.73 3110.61 1613.94 3440.39 1339.27 2649.23 
No. of Children 2.87 1.53 2.79 1.51 2.97 1.55 
IHDS 2005 (8-23) N=19002 N=10514 N=8488 
Father's Sch. 5.59 4.56 5.47 4.6 5.74 4.52 
Educ. Exp. 1667.11 3469.9 1802.6 3836.22 1499.27 2945.42 
No. of Children 2.91 1.55 2.8 1.53 3.03 1.55 
NSS 1995 (6-13) N=26668 N=15819 N=10849 
Father's Sch. 3.31 2.08 3.18 2.06 3.50 2.10 
Educ. Exp. 386.44 477.52 398.38 484.29 369.03 466.95 
No. of Children 2.47 1.06 2.37 1.04 2.61 1.07 
NSS 1995 (6-18) N=37155 N=23172 N=13983 
Father's Sch. 3.36 2.10 3.21 2.08 3.59 2.12 
Educ. Exp. 543.89 655.29 568.55 677.05 503.02 615.41 
No. of Children 2.45 1.10 2.35 1.08 2.63 1.11 
Notes: CFPS stands for China Family Panel Survey, IHDS stands for Indian Human Development Survey, and 
NSS stands for National Sample Survey. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table T2.IU: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban India 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
 
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.46*** 0.52*** 0.066*** 0.55*** 0.65*** 0.094*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.011) (0.023) (0.025) (0.034) 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.0070*** -0.0093*** -0.0022 
    (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0022) 
Intercept 6.96*** 5.97*** -0.99*** 6.81*** 5.80*** -1.00*** 
 (0.071) (0.075) (0.10) (0.085) (0.086) (0.12) 
No. Observations 9449 9070 18519 9449 9070 18519 
 Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 6.81 5.80  IGME0 0.55 0.65 
       
ES5 9.39 8.82  IGME5 0.485 0.556 
       
ES10 11.61 11.37  IGME10 0.414 0.464 
       
ES16 13.82 13.82  IGME16 0.330 0.353 
       
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2012 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal 
effect when father has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  
K=0,5,10,16. (4) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table T3.IU:  Father's Education and  Educational Expenditure on Children 
 URBAN INDIA 
 IHDS 2005 
 (6-22) Years Children (8-23) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 384.4*** 338.7*** 403.9*** 348.0*** 
 (14.9) (14.40) (17.4) (16.9) 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -34.00* -37.50* -36.5 -40.2* 
Dummy (20.5) (20.3) (23.9) (23.5) 
     
Daughter Dummy -290.2*** -189.9 -325.1** -174.3 
 (136.9) (138.7) (164.4) (162.9) 
Intercept 784.8*** 2763.50*** 917.3*** 3220.7*** 
 (105.1) (148) (124.9) (175.6) 
No. of Children  -673.1***  -777.7*** 
  (36.0)  (41.9) 
No. Observations 13086 13086 11051 11051 
 NSS 1995 
 (6-18) Years Children (8-18) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 108.4*** 108.4*** 110.4*** 110.9*** 
 (2.817) (2.817) (3.070) (3.039) 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -11.3*** -11.3*** -11.2*** -11.2*** 
Dummy (3.906) (3.906) (4.295) (4.238) 
   
  
Daughter Dummy -39.4 -39.4 -41.6 -11.1 
 (26.12) (26.12) (29.00) (29.03) 
Intercept 505.9*** 505.9*** 543.6*** 1004.0*** 
 (17.95) (17.95) (19.75) (26.13) 
No. of Children    -178.0*** 
   
 (7.963) 
No. Observations 27810 27810 24443 24443 
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2005 and NSS 1995 respectively. (2) Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table T2.IR: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural India 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF  
 
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
 
      
Linear Coefft 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.075*** 0.52*** 0.64*** 0.12*** 
 
(0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0095) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.0070*** -0.011*** -0.0070*** 
 
   (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0014) 
Intercept 6.39*** 4.24*** -2.14*** 6.32*** 4.16*** -2.16*** 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.062) (0.048) (0.046) (0.066) 
No. Observations 16957 17022 33979 16957 17022 33979 
  
Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 6.32 4.16  IGME0 0.52 0.64 
 
      
ES5 8.75 7.09  IGME5 0.454 0.533 
 
      
ES10    10.82 9.46  IGME10 0.384 0.426 
 
      
ES16 12.85 11.58  IGME16 0.300 0.298 
 
            
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2012 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal 
effect when father has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  
K=0,5,10,16. (4) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table T3.IR:  Father's Education and Educational Expenditure on Children 
 RURAL INDIA 
 IHDS 2005 
 (6-22) Years Children (8-23) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 153.9*** 145.4*** 169.2*** 158.7*** 
 (9.08) (8.77) (11.0) (10.6) 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -22.8** -21.9* -24.0* -22.4 
Dummy (11.4) (11.3) (13.9) (13.7) 
     
Daughter Dummy -182.5*** -137.1*** -211.0*** -134.0** 
 (43.5) (43.7) (52.3) (52.7) 
Intercept 772.3*** 1585.4*** 877.6*** 1949.3*** 
 (33.3) (54.7) (39.8) (67.9) 
No. of Children  -274.4***  -361.9*** 
  (17.2)  (21.8) 
No. Observations 23058 23058 19002 19002 
 NSS 1995 
 (6-18) Years Children (8-18) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 35.2*** 35.2*** 36.5*** 37.5*** 
 (1.425) (1.425) (1.535) (1.567) 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -3.7* -3.7* -3.4 -3.5 
Dummy (2.083) (2.083) (2.285) (2.281) 
   
  
Daughter Dummy -74.1*** -74.1*** -65.2*** -58.5*** 
 (8.694) (8.694) (9.700) (9.729) 
Intercept 426.9*** 426.9*** 461.0*** 507.7*** 
 (5.420) (5.420) (5.882) (9.728) 
No. of Children    -21.6*** 
   
 (3.749) 
No. Observations 37144 37144 32499 32499 
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2005 and NSS 1995 respectively. (2) Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table T2.CU: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban China 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF  
 
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.29*** 0.35*** 0.061*** 0.093** 0.32*** 0.22*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.045) (0.045) (0.063) 
Quadratic Coefft.    0.015*** 0.0023 -0.012*** 
    (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0041) 
Intercept 8.97*** 8.51*** -0.46** 9.33*** 8.57*** -0.76*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.25) 
No. Observations 3192 3241 6433 3192 3241 6433 
  
Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 9.33 8.51  IGME0 0.093 0.35 
 
      
ES6 10.43 10.61  IGME6 0.268 0.35 
 
      
ES9    11.38 11.66  IGME9 0.354 0.35 
 
      
ES16 14.66 14.11  IGME16 0.558 0.35 
 
            
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal 
effect when father has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  
K=0,6,9,16. (4) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Table T3.CU:  Father's Education and Educational Expenditure on Children 
 URBAN CHINA 
 CFPS 2010 
 (6-22) Years Children (8-23) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 236.9*** 162.8*** 225.4*** 138.3*** 
 (35.0) (34.1) (32.9) (30.5) 
Father's Sch. * Daughter 36.8 18.6 27.5 13.5 
Dummy (48.2) (46.9) (49.2) (47.4) 
     
Daughter Dummy -71.2 181.1 22.4 267.5 
 (400.2) (386.8) (413.7) (397.5) 
Intercept 827.4*** 4137.0*** 1034.3*** 4592.9*** 
 (278.8) (337.8) (264.5) (330.1) 
No. of Children  -2222.0***  -2401.2*** 
  (132.7)  (154.4) 
No. Observations 2784 2784 2435 2435 
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2010. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table T2.CR: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural China 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF  
 
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
 
      
Linear Coefft 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.062*** 0.27*** 0.38*** 0.11* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.042) (0.045) (0.061) 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.00025 -0.0047 -0.0045 
    (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0051) 
Intercept 7.59*** 6.78*** -0.81*** 7.59*** 6.73*** -0.86*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) 
No. Observations 3955 4085 8040 3955 4085 8040 
  
Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 7.59 6.78  IGRC 0.27 0.33 
       
ES5 9.21 8.76     
    
   
ES10    10.02 9.75     
    
   
ES16 11.91 12.06     
 
      
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal 
effect when father has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  
K=0,6,9,16. (4) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table T3.CR:  Father's Education and Educational Expenditure on Children 
 RURAL CHINA 
 CFPS 2010 
 6-22 Year Children 8-23 Year Children 
Father's Sch. 105.5*** 79.6*** 115.7*** 85.6*** 
 (12.8) (12.1) (15.0) (14.0) 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -31.8* -31.2* -21.7 -21.7 
Dummy (17.3) (16.6) (20.9) (20.0) 
     
Daughter Dummy 151.6 240.3** 111.2 275.2** 
 (103.1) (100.6) (120.7) (117.1) 
Intercept 648.0*** 1939.7*** 705.7*** 2173.6*** 
 (71.0) (117.9) (83.3) (132.7) 
No. of Children  -716.8***  -838.0*** 
  (49.7)  (56.8) 
No. Observations 4326 4326 3632 3632 
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2010. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
 Table 4.I: Returns to Education Estimates for India 
 URBAN (U) RURAL (R) ALL INDIA  (R + U) 
 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women Year 
SECONDARY  
Duraisamy (2002) 14.7 32.4 17.9 34.1 
  
1993/94 
Kingdon (1998) 4.9 13.4 
    
1995 
Kanjilal et al. (2017) 74.1 91.9 
    
2011/12 
Bargain et al. (2009) 
    
24 64 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009) 
    
28 64 1993/95 
Bargain et al. (2009)         25 41 2002/04 
HIGHER SECONDARY  
Duraisamy (2002) 10.1 12.9 8.4 11 
  
1993/94 
Kanjilal et al. (2017) 108 123 101.4 124.3 
  
2011/12 
Kingdon (1998) 17.6 20.8 
     
Bargain et al. (2009) 
    
64 124 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009) 
    
60 136 1993/95 
Bargain et al. (2009) 
    
55 109 2002/04 
                
COLLEGE  
Duraisamy (2002) 13.2 9.3 11.6 10.1 
  
1993/94 
Kanjilal et al. (2017) 150.9 153.6 141 146.9 
  
2011/12 
Kingdon (1998) 18 8.9 
     
Bargain et al. (2009) 
    
111 174 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009) 
    
108 175 1993/95 
Bargain et al. (2009)         121 170 2002/04 
Note: The complete references for the studies cited are in the online appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.C: Returns to Education Estimates for China 
Mincerian Returns to Years of Schooling 
  
 URBAN (U) RURAL (R)   
  Men Women Men Women Year  
Jamison, D., & Van der Gaag, J. (1987) 4.5 5.5   1985 
Xie, Y., & Hannum, E. (1996) 2.2 4.4   1988/1989 
Johnson, E. N., & Chow, G. C. (1997) 2.78 4.46 2.95 4.82 1988/1989 
Liu, Z. (1998) 2.39 3.31   1988/1989 
Meng, X. (1998)   1.1 2.2 1986/1987 
Maurer‐Fazio, M. (1999) 3.74 4.94   1991/1992 
Li, H. (2003) 4.3 6.9   1995/196 
Bishop, J.., Luo, F., Wang, F. (2005) 3.56 4.43   1995/1996 
Zhang, J., Zhao, Y., Park, A., Song, X. 
(2005) 2.9 5.2 
  1988 
Zhang, J., Zhao, Y., Park, A., Song, X. 
(2005) 8.4 13.2 
  2001 
Hauser, S. M., & Xie, Y. (2005) 3.6 7.4   1995/1996 
Ren, W., & Miller, P. W. (2012)   3.81 7.18 2006 
Chen, Q., Xu, J., Zhao, J., & Zhang, B. 
(2017) 
  6.8  2004 
Xiao, S., & Asadullah, M. N (2018) 7.1 9     2010 
SECONDARY (Estimates for All China (R+U)) 
 Men Women  
Bargain et al. (2009) 3 15 1987/88 
    
Bargain et al. (2009) 11 25 2002/04 
HIGHER SECONDARY (Estimates are for All China (R+U)) 
 Men Women  
Bargain et al. (2009) 9 26 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009) 26 51 2002/04 
COLLEGE 
 Rural All China (R+U) 
 
 Men Women Men Women  
Gustafsson, B and Li, S (2000) 8.9 10.2   1988/1989 
Gustafsson, B and Li, S (2000) 15.5 20.8   1995/1996 
Bargain et al. (2009)   24 42 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009)   54 84 2002/04 
Wang, L. (2012) 21.1 27   1995/1996 
Wang, L. (2012) 48.2 56.6     2002/2003 
Note: Full citations are provided in the online appendix. 
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Omitted Proofs for the Results on Urban India in Section (2.3)
(1) Using equation (11) in the text, we have the following:
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σjRcj and the last inequality above follows from the observation
that
(
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0
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1
σjRcj − α1
)
> 0 when θj
0
> 0 which is in fact the case for both j = s, d
according to the empirical evidence reported in the text. Thus, a higher estimate of ability
by parents would result in a higher slope of the curve at each point.
Since at Rcj = 0, the value of θj
0
does not depend on the ability of a child, the curve for
a higher ability estimate, ceteris paribus, lies above the curve for a lower ability estimate
at all positive values of returns to schooling for children.
(2) For a higher school quality, we have the following (again, using equation (11) in the
main text):
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(3) The claim that the effects of pure son preference on the slope is not unambiguous
follows from the result below:
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The above expression cannot be signed because we do not know the sign of
(
α2 − δ˜
j
2
σjRcj
)
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Liu (1998), Meng and Kidd (1997), Maurer-Fazio (1999), Li (2003), Bishop et al. (2005),
Zhang et al. (2005), Asadullah and Xiao (2020), Hauser and Xie (2005), Ren and Miller
(2012), Bargain et al. (2009), Wang (2012), Gustafsson and Li (2000).
Papers Cited on Returns to Education in India
Duraisamy (2002), Bargain et al. (2009), Kingdon (1998), Kanjilal-Bhaduri and Pastore
(2018).
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Table A1.S: Construction of Matched Sons-Fathers in India 
 
 
IHDS Wave 1 
Azam (2015) IHDS Wave 2 
Total Num of Individuals 
Surveyed in IHDS 
 215,784 204,569 
Total Num of Men in 20-65 
Age Group 
 58,194 56,883 
Education Information 
Missing (dropped) 
 325 232 
 
Identification through 
coresidence only 
Father identified if coresidence is 
used 19,556 19,629 
 
percentage of male aged 20-65 who 
can be potentially matched using 
coresidence 
33.60% 34.508% 
 
Panel A. Total Number of 
Men (20-65 age group) with 
Education Information 
Identification of Father   
 a) Individual is head of household 34,069 31,780 
 
b) Individual who are not household 
heads, however, whose father is 
living in the household 
18,056 18,325 
 
c) Individual is neither head of the 
household, nor his father is living in 
the household (no father 
identification is provided) 
4,029 1,905 
 
d1) Individual is head's father 
(dropped, father cannot be 
identified) 
591  
 
d2) Individual's father cannot be 
identified (dropped) 1,124 
 
Total number of men (20-65 
age group) whose father is 
identified: a) + b) + c) 
 56,154 52,010 
Percentage of men (20-65 age 
group, panel A) whose fathers 
are identified 
 96.494% 91.433% 
Notes: Column 1-3 are directly obtained from Table 8 in Azam (2015) using IHDS 2005 while column 4 is based on 
authors’ own calculation using IHDS 2012.  
 
Table A1.D. Construction of Matched Daughters-Fathers in India 
 
IHDS Wave 2 
Azam (2016) IHDS Wave 2 
Total Surveyed women in age 20-49 45,319 45,319 
Total Surveyed women in age 20-49, with non-missing 
education information  45,276 45,276 
Father's Edu from household co-resident 4,416 4,957 
Father's edu from Women's Module 34,290 34,290 
Total Women whose father's Edu is available 38,706 39,247 
% of surveyed women for whom father's Edu is 
available  85.49% 86.68% 
Notes: Column 1-2 are directly obtained from Table 1 in Azam (2016) using IHDS 2012 while column 
3 is based on authors’ own calculation using IHDS 2012.  
 
  
Table A2.IU.A: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban India  
(18-35 Years Age Cohorts) 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
 
      
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
 
      
Linear Coefft. 0.46 0.52 0.066 0.55 0.65 0.094 
 (0.0074)*** (0.0080)*** (0.011)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.034)*** 
 [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.035]*** [0.036]*** [0.039]*** 
 {0.024}*** {0.022}*** {0.017}*** {0.046}*** {0.037}*** {0.043}*** 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.0070 -0.0093 -0.0022 
    (0.0014)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0022) 
    [0.0022]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0025] 
    {0.0022}*** {0.0025}*** {0.0025} 
Intercept 6.96 5.97 -0.99 6.81 5.80 -1.00 
 (0.071)*** (0.075)*** (0.10)*** (0.085)*** (0.086)*** (0.12)*** 
 [0.14]*** [0.17]*** [0.13]*** [0.15]*** [0.17]*** [0.13]*** 
 {0.34}*** {0.37}*** {0.17}*** {0.35}*** {0.35}*** {0.17}*** 
No. Observation 9449 9070 18519 9449 9070 18519 
  Mobility Estimates from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 6.81 5.80  IGME0 0.55 0.65 
       
ES5 9.39 8.82  IGME5 0.485 0.556 
       
ES10    11.61 11.37  IGME10 0.414 0.464 
       
ES16 13.82 13.82  IGME16 0.330 0.353 
  
      
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2012 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,5,10,16. (4) Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at district-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at state-level in 
braces; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Table A2.IU.B: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban India 
(18-30 Years Age Cohorts) 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
 
      
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
 
      
Linear Coefft. 0.44 0.50 0.06 0.53 0.62 0.084 
 (0.0085)*** (0.0091)*** (0.012)*** (0.027)*** (0.029)*** (0.039)** 
 [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.016]*** [0.040]*** [0.038]*** [0.041]** 
 {0.029}*** {0.026}*** {0.016}*** {0.059}*** {0.038}*** {0.039}** 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.0069 -0.0088 -0.0019 
    (0.0016)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0024) 
    [0.0025]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0026] 
    {0.0027}** {0.0025}*** {0.0024} 
Intercept 7.18 6.45 -0.74 7.02 6.27 -0.75 
 (0.082)*** (0.089)*** (0.12)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.14)*** 
 [0.17]*** [0.19]*** [0.14]*** [0.18]*** [0.19]*** [0.15]*** 
 {0.40}*** {0.42}*** {0.16}*** {0.43}*** {0.40}*** {0.16}*** 
No. Observation 7314 6826 14140 7314 6826 14140 
  
Mobility Estimates from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 7.02 6.27  IGME0 0.53 0.62 
       
ES5 9.50 9.15  IGME5 0.463 0.528 
       
ES10    11.63 11.59  IGME10 0.394 0.441 
       
ES16 13.73 13.94  IGME16 0.312 0.335 
  
      
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2012 with children aged 18-30. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,5,10,16. (4) Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at district-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at state-level in 
braces; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
       
 
 
  
Table A2.CU.A: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban China 
(18-35 Years Age Cohorts) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.29 0.35 0.061 0.093 0.32 0.22 
 (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.023)*** (0.045)** (0.045)*** (0.063)*** 
 [0.027]*** [0.020]*** [0.025]** [0.063] [0.060]*** [0.074]*** 
Quadratic Coefft.    0.015 0.0023 -0.012 
    (0.0029)*** (0.0029) (0.0041)*** 
    [0.0034]*** [0.0037] [0.0049]** 
Intercept 8.97 8.51 -0.46 9.33 8.57 -0.76 
 (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.21)** (0.18)*** (0.18)*** (0.25)*** 
 [0.20]*** [0.27]*** [0.274]* [0.25]*** [0.30]*** [0.31]** 
No. Observations 3192 3241 6433 3192 3241 6433 
 Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 9.33 8.51  IGME0 0.093 0.35 
       
ES6 10.43 10.61  IGME6 0.268 0.35 
       
ES9 11.38 11.66  IGME9 0.354 0.35 
       
ES16 14.66 14.11  IGME16 0.558 0.35 
       
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling, (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Table A2.CU.B: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban China 
(18-30 Years Age Cohorts) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
   
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.26 0.35 0.089 0.067 0.34 0.28 
 (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.027)*** (0.052) (0.055)*** (0.076)*** 
 [0.025]*** [0.024]*** [0.028]*** [0.052] [0.077]*** [0.075]*** 
Quadratic Coefft. 
   
0.014 0.00048 -0.014 
 
   
(0.0034)*** (0.0034) (0.0048)*** 
 
   [0.0030]*** [0.0045] [0.0049]*** 
Intercept 9.19 8.58 -0.61 9.59 8.6 -0.99 
 (0.17)*** (0.18)*** (0.25)** (0.21)*** (0.23)*** (0.31)*** 
 [0.20]*** [0.28]*** [0.33]* [0.23]*** [0.36]*** [0.38]** 
No. Observations 2230 2205 4435 2230 2205 4435 
 Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 9.59 8.58  IGME0 0.067 0.35 
  
 
  
  
ES6 10.50 10.68  IGME6 0.237 0.35 
  
 
  
  
ES9 11.33 11.73  IGME9 0.322 0.35 
  
 
  
  
ES16 14.25 14.18  IGME16 0.521 0.35 
       
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with children aged 18-30. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling, (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Table A2.IR.A: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural India 
(18-35 Years Age Cohorts) 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF  
   
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.45 0.52 0.075 0.52 0.64 0.12 
 (0.0064)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0095)*** (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.028)*** 
 [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.027]*** [0.030]*** [0.033]*** 
 {0.017}*** {0.025}*** {0.024}*** {0.031}*** {0.053}*** {0.044}*** 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 
    (0.0014)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0014)*** 
    [0.0019]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0019]*** 
    {0.0020}*** {0.0034}*** {0.0020}*** 
Intercept 6.38 4.24 -2.14 6.32 4.16 -2.14 
 (0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.062)*** (0.048)*** (0.046)*** (0.062)*** 
 [0.12]*** [0.14]*** [0.097]*** [0.12]*** [0.14]*** [0.0097]*** 
 {0.25}*** {0.38}*** {0.21}*** {0.25}*** {0.37}*** {0.21}*** 
No. Observations 16957 17022 33979 16957 17022 33979 
  Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 6.32 4.16  IGME0 0.52 0.64 
       
ES5 8.75 7.09  IGME5 0.454 0.533 
       
ES10    10.82 9.46  IGME10 0.384 0.426 
       
ES16 12.85 11.58  IGME16 0.300 0.298 
 
      
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2012 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,5,10,16. (4) Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at district-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at state-
level in braces; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 
 
 
Table A2.IR.B: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural India 
(18-30 Years Age Cohorts) 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF  
   
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.42 0.51 0.083 0.49 0.63 0.14 
 (0.0071)*** (0.0079)*** (0.011)*** (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.031)*** 
 [0.011]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.028]*** [0.032]*** [0.034]*** 
 {0.017}*** {0.027}*** {0.023}*** {0.033}*** {0.054}*** {0.0020}*** 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.0061 -0.011 -0.0051 
    (0.0016)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0025)** 
    [0.0019]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0025]** 
    {0.0020}*** {0.0033}*** {0.0025}* 
Intercept 6.69 4.76 -1.93 6.63 4.67 -1.96 
 (0.050)*** (0.051)*** (0.072)*** (0.055)*** (0.054)*** (0.077)*** 
 [0.12]*** [0.15]*** [0.11]*** [0.13]*** [0.16]*** [0.11]*** 
 {0.26}*** {0.42}*** {0.23}*** {0.27}*** {0.41}*** {0.23}*** 
No. Observations 12946 12959 25903 12946 12959 25903 
  
Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 6.63 4.67  IGME0 0.49 0.63 
       
ES5 8.93 7.55  IGME5 0.429 0.518 
       
ES10    10.92 9.87  IGME10 0.369 0.407 
       
ES16 12.91 11.93  IGME16 0.296 0.272 
 
      
  
    
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2012 with children aged 18-30. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,5,10,16. (4) Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at district-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at state-
level in braces; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
   
Table A2.CR.A: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural China 
(18-35 Years Age Cohorts) 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
 
  
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
 
      
Linear Coefft. 0.27 0.33 0.062 0.27 0.38 0.11 
 (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.021)*** (0.042)*** (0.045)*** (0.061)* 
 [0.040]*** [0.045]*** [0.025]** [0.096]*** [0.11]*** [0.062]* 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.00025 -0.0047 -0.0045 
    (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0051) 
    [0.0058] [0.0075] [0.0050] 
Intercept 7.59 6.78 -0.81 7.59 6.73 -0.86 
 (0.11)*** (0.12)*** (0.17)*** (0.12)*** (0.13)*** (0.18)*** 
 [0.36]*** [0.42]*** [0.32]** [0.40]*** [0.48]*** [0.33]** 
No. Observations 3955 4085 8040 3955 4085 8040 
  
Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 7.59 6.78  IGRC 0.27 0.33 
       
ES6 9.21 8.76     
    
   
ES9    10.02 9.75     
    
   
ES16 11.91 12.06     
 
  
     
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
   
Table A2.CR.B: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural China 
(18-30 Years Age Cohorts) 
 
LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF  
   
 
Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
 
      
Linear Coefft. 0.27 0.32 0.054 0.27 0.38 0.11 
 (0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.025)** (0.048)*** (0.053)*** (0.071) 
 [0.039]*** [0.049]*** [0.028]* [0.10]** [0.12]*** [0.051]** 
Quadratic Coefft.    -0.00047 -0.0056 -0.0052 
    (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0058) 
    [0.0067] [0.0075] [0.0037] 
Intercept 7.91 7.37 -0.54 7.90 7.31 -0.60*** 
 (0.13)*** (0.15)*** (0.20)*** (0.14)*** (0.16)*** (0.22) 
 [0.34]*** [0.41]*** [0.27]* [0.38]*** [0.47]*** [0.26]* 
No. Observations 2833 2814 5647 2833 2814 5647 
  
Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 
Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 
Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 7.91 7.37  IGRC 0.27 0.32 
       
ES6 9.53 9.29     
    
   
ES9    10.34 10.25     
    
   
ES16 12.23 12.49     
       
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with children aged 18-30. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect when father 
has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
   
Table A2.CU.C: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban China  
(18-35 Years Age Cohorts. First-born Sample) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
   
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.28 0.36 0.083 0.11 0.34 0.24 
 (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.026)*** (0.053)** (0.051)*** (0.074)*** 
 [0.024]*** (0.021)*** [0.027]*** [0.067] [0.066]*** [0.079]*** 
Quadratic Coefft.    0.013 0.0015 -0.011 
    (0.0033)*** (0.0032) (0.0046)** 
    [0.0037]*** [0.0040] [0.0053]** 
Intercept 9.26 8.47 -0.79 9.62 8.51 -1.11 
 (0.18)*** (0.17)*** (0.25)*** (0.22)*** (0.21)*** (0.30)*** 
 [0.21]*** [0.30]*** [0.29]*** [0.28]*** [0.34]*** [0.33]*** 
No. Observations 2428 2617 5045 2428 2617 5045 
 Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 9.62 8.47  IGME0 0.12 0.36 
       
ES6 10.75 10.63  IGME6 0.257 0.36 
       
ES9 11.66 11.71  IGME9 0.333 0.36 
       
ES16 14.71 14.23  IGME16 0.51 0.36 
       
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with first-born children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect 
when father has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
  
Table A2.CU.D: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban China  
(18-30 Years Age Cohorts. First-born Sample) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
   
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft. 0.25 0.37 0.12 0.072 0.4 0.33 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.032)*** (0.062) (0.065)*** (0.090)*** 
 [0.025]*** (0.026)*** [0.030]*** [0.066] [0.089]*** [0.088]*** 
Quadratic Coefft.    0.013 -0.0018 -0.014 
    (0.0038)*** (0.0039) (0.0054)** 
    [0.0039]*** [0.0053] [0.0059]** 
Intercept 9.53 8.45 -1.07 9.93 8.4 -1.53 
 (0.21)*** (0.22)*** (0.30)*** (0.26)*** (0.28)*** (0.38)*** 
 [0.22]*** [0.30]*** [0.34]*** [0.30]*** [0.41]*** [0.40]*** 
No. Observations 1668 1748 3416 1668 1748 3416 
 Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 9.93 8.45  IGME0 0.12 0.37 
       
ES6 10.83 10.67  IGME6 0.222 0.37 
       
ES9 11.63 11.78  IGME9 0.298 0.37 
       
ES16 14.41 14.37  IGME16 0.474 0.37 
       
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with first-born children aged 18-30. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect 
when father has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
   
Table A2.CR.C: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural China  
(18-35 Years Age Cohorts. First-born Sample) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
   
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft 0.26 0.33 0.069 0.25 0.33 0.08 
 (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.027)** (0.055)*** (0.019)*** (0.078) 
 [0.036]*** [0.046]*** [0.023]*** [0.097]** [0.046]*** [0.074] 
Quadratic Coefft.    0.00031 -0.00071 -0.001 
    (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0064) 
    [0.0060] [0.0073] [0.0067] 
Intercept 7.72 6.85 -0.86 7.72 6.84 -0.88 
 (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.21)*** (0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.24)*** 
 [0.31]*** [0.41]*** [0.27]*** [0.36]*** [0.47]*** [0.29]*** 
No. Observations 2444 2772 5216 2444 2772 5216 
 Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 7.72 6.85  IGRC 0.26 0.33 
       
ES6 9.28 8.83     
    
   
ES9 10.06 9.82     
    
   
ES16 11.88 12.13     
       
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with first-born children aged 18-35. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect 
when father has K years of schooling. (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
   
Table A2.CR.D: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural China  
(18-30 Years Age Cohorts. First-born Sample) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
 
 Sons (S) Daughters (D) D-S Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) D-S 
       
Linear Coefft 0.25 0.32 0.073 0.2 0.32 0.12 
 (0.022)*** (0.024)*** (0.032)** (0.062)*** (0.065)*** (0.090) 
 [0.030]*** [0.044]*** [0.031]*** [0.091]** [0.098]*** [0.055] 
Quadratic Coefft.    0.0043 0.00048 -0.0039 
    (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0072) 
    [0.0063] [0.0060] [0.0042] 
Intercept 8.11 7.43 -0.68 8.16 7.43 -0.73 
 (0.17)*** (0.18)*** (0.25)*** (0.19)*** (0.20)*** (0.28)*** 
 [0.25]*** [0.34]*** [0.24]*** [0.30]*** [0.40]*** [0.24]*** 
No. Observations 1732 1888 3620 1732 1888 3620 
 Estimates of Mobility from Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility   Relative Mobility 
 Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
ES0 8.11 7.43  IGRC 0.25 0.32 
       
ES6 9.61 9.35     
    
   
ES9 10.36 10.31     
    
   
ES16 12.11 12.55     
       
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2016 with first-born children aged 18-30. (2) IGMEK is Intergenerational Marginal effect 
when father has K years of schooling, (3) ESK is expected schooling when father has K years of schooling.  K=0,6,9,16. (4) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at province-level in square brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Table A3.IU:  Father's Education and  Educational Expenditure on Children 
 URBAN INDIA 
 IHDS 2005 
 (6-22) Years Children (8-23) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 384.4 338.7 403.9 348 
 (14.9)*** (14.40)*** (17.4)*** (16.9)*** 
 [22.2]*** [20.4]*** [24.1]*** [22.6]*** 
 {28.2}*** {26.4}*** {30.9}*** {28.8}*** 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -34.0 -37.5 -36.5 -40.2 
Dummy (20.5)* (20.3)* (23.9) (23.5)* 
 [19.0]* [18.4]** [21.9]* [21.1]* 
 {18.7}* {16.7}** {23.9} {19.6}** 
Daughter Dummy -290.2 -189.9 -325.1 -174.3 
 (136.9)*** (138.7) (164.4)** (162.9) 
 [125.0]** [118.9] [144.0]** [138.6] 
 {142.2}* {123.9} {171.0}* {148.0} 
Intercept 784.8 2763.5 917.3 3220.7 
 (105.1)*** (148)*** (124.9)*** (175.6)*** 
 [157.5]*** [271.2]*** [185.7]*** [332.3]*** 
 {223.2}*** {279.4}*** {255.2}*** {338.3}*** 
No. of Children  -673.1  -777.7 
  (36.0)***  (41.9)*** 
  [75.9]***  [88.8]*** 
  {83.1}***  {99.8}*** 
No. Observations 13086 13086 11051 11051 
 NSS 1995 
 (6-18) Years Children (8-18) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 108.4 108.6 110.4 110.9 
 (2.817)*** (2.789)*** (3.070)*** (3.039)*** 
 [7.819]*** [7.467]*** [7.436]*** [7.021]*** 
 {7.898}*** {7.735}*** {7.781}*** {7.644}*** 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -11.3 -11.5 -11.2 -11.2 
Dummy (3.906)*** (3.860)*** (4.295)*** (4.238)*** 
 [2.766]*** [2.788]*** [3.114]*** [3.121]*** 
 {4.559}** {4.497}** {4.682}** {4.616}** 
Daughter Dummy -39.4 -14.3 -41.55 -11.14 
 (26.12) (26.15) (29.00) (29.03) 
 [16.95]*** [17.48] [21.47] [22.19] 
 {26.77} {29.61} {30.19} {33.90} 
Intercept 505.9 923.0 543.6 1004.0 
 (17.95)*** (23.74)*** (19.75)*** (26.13)*** 
 [22.78]*** [54.14]*** [23.99]*** [57.27]*** 
 {43.75}*** {79.43}*** {44.32}*** {85.89}*** 
No. of Children  -161.1  -178.0 
 
 (7.164)***  (7.963)*** 
  [19.38]***  [19.83]*** 
  {22.93}***  {24.72}*** 
No. Observations 27810 27810 24443 24443 
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2005 and NSS 1995 respectively. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
standard errors clustered at district-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at state-level in braces; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
Table A3.CU:  Father's Education and Educational Expenditure on Children 
 URBAN CHINA 
 CFPS 2010 
 (6-22) Years Children (8-23) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 236.9 162.8 225.4 138.3 
 (35.0)*** (34.1)*** (32.9)*** (30.5)*** 
 [38.7]*** [36.0]*** [39.1]*** [33.9]*** 
 {63.9}*** {47.5}*** {72.6}*** {56.4}** 
Father's Sch. * Daughter 36.8 18.6 27.5 13.5 
Dummy (48.2) (46.9) (49.2) (47.4) 
 [39.2] [39.6] [38.6] [38.9] 
 {31.9} {31.5} {24.4} {27.9} 
Daughter Dummy -71.2 181.1 22.4 267.5 
 (400.2) (386.8) (413.7) (397.5) 
 [327.1] [348.5] [334.6] [364.5] 
 {275.1} {305.8} {252.7} {318.8} 
Intercept 827.4 4137.0 1034.3 4592.9 
 (278.8)*** (337.8)*** (264.5)*** (330.1)*** 
 [300.0]*** [397.1]*** [295.5]*** [401.7]*** 
 {316.8}** {436.8}*** {292.6}*** {488.9}*** 
No. of Children  -2222.0  -2401.2 
  (132.7)***  (154.4)*** 
  [211.3]***  [233.4]*** 
  {366.3}***  {412.4}*** 
No. Observations 2784 2784 2435 2435 
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2010. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered 
at county-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at province-level in braces; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.IR:  Father's Education and Educational Expenditure on Children 
 RURAL INDIA 
 IHDS 2005 
 (6-22) Years Children (8-23) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 153.9 145.4 169.2 158.7 
 (9.08)*** (8.77)*** (11.0)*** (10.6)*** 
 [16.3]*** [15.5]*** [19.8]*** [18.5]*** 
 {23.5}*** {21.5}*** {262.4}*** {23.8}*** 
Father's Sch. * Daughter 
-22.8 -21.9 -24.0 -22.4 
Dummy (11.4)** (11.3)* (13.9)* (13.7) 
 [13.0]* [12.8]* [15.4] [15.1] 
 {8.69}** {9.11}** {9.63}** {10.3}** 
Daughter Dummy 
-182.5 -137.1 -211.0 -134.0 
 (43.5)*** (43.7)*** (52.3)*** (52.7)** 
 [47.7]*** [49.1]*** [58.6]*** [60.9]** 
 {38.1}*** {42.5}*** {48.5}*** {56.7}** 
Intercept 772.3 1585.4 877.6 1949.3 
 (33.3)*** (54.7)*** (39.8)*** (67.9)*** 
 [60.9]*** [101.5]*** [69.7]*** [125.9]*** 
 {106.3}*** {214.7}*** {118.4}*** {256.0}*** 
No. of Children 
 
-274.4  -361.9 
 
 
(17.2)***  (21.8)*** 
 
 [32.4]***  [42.4]*** 
 
 {52.7}***  {65.7}*** 
No. Observations 23058 23058 19002 19002 
 NSS 1995 
 (6-18) Years Children (8-18) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 35.2 36.0 36.5 37.5 
 (1.425)*** (1.453)*** (1.535)*** (1.567)*** 
 [2.444]*** [2.408]*** [2.501]*** [2.477]*** 
 {4.779}*** {4.739}*** {4.678}*** {4.647}*** 
Father's Sch. * Daughter 
-3.7 -3.8 -3.4 -3.5 
Dummy (2.083)* (2.081)* (2.285) (2.281) 
 [2.115]* [2.094]* [2.236] [2.210] 
 {2.097}* {2.068}* {2.100} {2.053}* 
Daughter Dummy 
-74.1 -69.2 -65.2 -58.5 
 (8.694)*** (8.719)*** (9.700)*** (9.729)*** 
 [9.920]*** [9.122]*** [9.454]*** [8.760]*** 
 {13.59}*** {13.40}*** {15.46}*** {15.11}*** 
Intercept 426.9 463.7 461.0 507.7 
 (5.420)*** (8.892)*** (5.882)*** (9.728)*** 
 [13.84]*** [14.70]*** [14.66]*** [16.35]*** 
 {31.18}*** {43.40}*** {32.70}*** {45.84}*** 
No. of Children 
 -17.0  -21.6 
 
 (3.393)***  (3.749)*** 
 
 [7.615]  [7.554]*** 
 
 {16.69}  {17.29} 
No. Observations 37144 37144 32499 32499 
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2005 and NSS 1995 respectively. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
standard errors clustered at district-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at state-level in braces; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A3.CR:  Father's Education and Educational Expenditure on Children 
 RURAL CHINA 
 CFPS 2010 
 (6-22) Years Children (8-23) Years Children 
Father's Sch. 105.5 79.6 115.7 85.6 
 (12.8)*** (12.1)*** (15.0)*** (14.0)*** 
 [15.3]*** [14.1]*** [17.5]*** [15.6]*** 
 {18.7}*** {15.3}*** {20.7}*** {14.8}*** 
Father's Sch. * Daughter -31.8 -31.2 -21.7 -21.7 
Dummy (17.3)* (16.6)* (20.9) (20.0) 
 [18.9]* [17.8]* [21.6] [19.8] 
 {21.0} {16.9}* {23.2} {16.5} 
Daughter Dummy 151.6 240.3 111.2 275.2 
 (103.1) (100.6)** (120.7) (117.1)** 
 [116.9] [110.3]** [132.5] [121.1]** 
 {147.9} {126.6}* {168.4} {135.9}* 
Intercept 648.0 1939.7 705.7 2173.6 
 (71.0)*** (117.9)*** (83.3)*** (132.7)*** 
 [88.1]*** [171.4]*** [100.0]*** [186.5]*** 
 {86.4}*** {229.6}*** {87.9}*** {246.5}*** 
No. of Children  -716.8  -838.0 
  (49.7)***  (56.8)*** 
  [87.2]***  [100.1]*** 
  {123.2}***  {141.5}*** 
No. Observations 4326 4326 3632 3632 
Notes: (1) The data used are CFPS 2010. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered 
at county-level in square brackets; standard errors clustered at province-level in braces; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
